

# The Cost of School Policing

*What Florida's students have paid for a pretense of security*

2018-19



# Acknowledgements

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Professor F. Chris Curran of University of Florida conducted the research and quantitative analysis underlying the findings of section IV and further explained in his research report provided in the appendix.

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# Executive Summary

School districts across the country are reassessing the efficacy of integrating police officers into schools. This comes after many years of advocacy from impacted youth and on the heels of increased awareness of police brutality and the misuse of law enforcement for social services. Many schools are beginning to feel the impacts of COVID-19 on their budgets and are struggling to provide the minimum resources needed for education, further calling into question the appropriateness of spending scarce education dollars on policing. Despite this, some school districts are paying for more police officers and security personnel than even required by state law.

In this conversation, Florida's school districts have been at the mercy of the Legislature. There has been a perception that they have only the false choice between placing a police officer or an armed civilian at every school due to a state mandate. Meanwhile, our students suffer:

- » For the first time ever, there are more police officers working in Florida schools (3,650) than school nurses (2,286).
- » The number of police officers in schools is more than double the number of school social workers (1,414) and school psychologists (1,452).
- » During the 2018-19 school year, the number of youth arrests at school increased 8%, while the number of youth arrested in the



community continued to decline by 12%.

- » The percentage of youth arrests happening at school hit a five-year high of 20%.
- » The number of students expelled from school increased 43%.
- » Schools reported more than four times as many incidents of using physical restraints on students.
- » Police officers arrested elementary-aged kids 345 times, including an arrest of a five year old and five arrests of six-year olds, during the 2018-19 school year.

An analysis of Florida's experiment with school policing illustrates that the school policing mandate has only increased negative outcomes for our students:

- » The presence of law enforcement was related to a greater frequency of school arrests (40-82% more at the school-level). This relationship existed at elementary, middle and high school levels.
- » The presence of law enforcement predicted greater numbers of behavioral incidents being reported to law enforcement, particularly for less severe infractions and among middle schoolers.
- » There was little consistent evidence that the presence of law enforcement decreased the number of behavioral incidents occurring, indicating that school-based law enforcement were not necessarily making schools safer.

**Florida lawmakers must repeal the mandate for police and stop the push for armed personnel in schools and return discretion to local communities over whether and how police should be involved in schools.** In the meantime, school districts can adopt policies, both internal and as part of memorandums of understanding with law enforcement agencies, to mitigate the harm of increased school policing:

- » Increase the employment of student support staff.
- » Adopt minimum training requirements and accountability measures for police working in schools.
- » Adopt a minimum age of arrest.
- » Adopt limitations on the use of force against children.
- » Adopt student codes of conduct with consequences clearly outlined for specified behavior that limit the involvement of law enforcement to those situations posing immediate safety risks.
- » Assign clear duties to officers to focus on controlling access to campus, not policing the hallways or engaging in student discipline.
- » Adopt effective discipline policies and practices that teach and reinforce positive behavior.

- » Educate teachers and staff to effectively manage classroom behavior and about when it is appropriate to call the police on their students and when it is not.
- » Teach students about their rights in police encounters and avoid blurring the lines between law enforcement and school staff when investigating, searching and interrogating students.

We cannot continue asking our students to carry the weight of adult fear and inaction at a time when they are more vulnerable than ever.



# Florida is *failing to meet* the emotional and mental health needs of its students

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While for some students, school provides a safe, stable environment, for many, it is their primary source of stress.

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Schools today in Florida look vastly different than they did five years ago. A school's status as the center of a community is largely becoming incompatible with security measures implemented due to fear of mass shootings. The evidence does not support the need for the recently enacted increases in school police officers - legislators have unfortunately allowed fear, and not evidence, to drive school policing policy in Florida.

- » Consistently fewer than 2% of all youth homicides each year happen at school.<sup>1</sup> This rate has not changed in decades.
- » The most recently available data, examining school-associated homicides between July 1994 and June 2017, found the rate of school-associated homicides in which there was a single victim was 0.03 per 100,000 students, while the rate of multiple-victim school-association homicides was 0.008 per 100,000 students.<sup>2</sup>
- » The rate of students being victimized, and the rate of specific crimes such as thefts and violent offenses, has been steadily declining.<sup>3</sup>

Students today are reporting more stress than any other generation,<sup>4</sup> and show significant declines in mental health and increasing suicidality.<sup>5</sup> While for some students, school provides a safe, stable environment, for many, it is their primary source of stress.<sup>6</sup> This reality is illustrated by increased suicide rates while school is in session.<sup>7</sup>




The current COVID-19 pandemic is adding to student stress and straining their access to support. It has also exposed inadequacies throughout our education and healthcare systems that work against our goal to meaningfully educate every Floridian.

Lastly, we know that mental health issues are most likely to emerge in adolescence - and are more efficiently treated early in their development.<sup>8</sup> One in five adolescents have a mental illness that will persist into adulthood, underscoring the need to take student stress seriously in an effort to prevent worsening of symptoms.<sup>9</sup>

Professionals trained to meet these needs exist. Over time, school-based mental health and student support professionals, including school counselors, school social workers, nurses and school psychologists, have emerged as effective at identifying and addressing student needs, either through direct service or referrals to resources. The majority of children and adolescents who receive mental and developmental health services do so at school.<sup>10</sup> These professionals also play a key role in designing school programs and structures that promote a healthy school climate.<sup>11</sup>

Ultimately, they are trained to do exactly the work the U.S. Secret Service identified as a key prevention practice for preventing school shootings - address and end bullying in schools, address the mental health needs of students, and foster high-quality relationships between staff and students so threats are better detected and reported.<sup>12</sup>

No school district met the industry standards for the number of students served by a single student support professional



Unfortunately, 52 percent of public schools nationwide report that inadequate funding was a major limitation in their efforts to provide mental health services to students.<sup>13</sup> In Florida, during the 2018-19 school year, no school district met the industry standards for the number of students

served by a single student support professional. School counselors recommend a ratio of 250 students per counselor, but in Florida the average ratio is 461:1.<sup>14</sup> School nurses, meanwhile, recommend ratios below 750:1 at the highest, but in Florida, an average of 1,240 students were served by a single Registered Nurse or Licensed Practice Nurse.<sup>15</sup> School psychologists recommend ratios of 500 students per psychologist, but in Florida there is only one school psychologist for every 1,961 students.<sup>16</sup> Like school counselors, social workers in schools work best with caseloads of no more than 250. But Florida has only one social worker for every 2,013 students.<sup>17</sup>



# The *fiscal cost of policing* in Florida schools

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
At least \$383 million was spent at the state and local levels to embed police officers or security personnel in schools during the 2018-19 school year - more than twice the amount spent in 2016-17.

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In the aftermath of the tragic mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, Florida policymakers took their guidance from law enforcement. The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (MSD Commission), established to examine the tragedy and identify lessons, was dominated by law enforcement officers, with no current teachers, no students or student organizations, no community or mentorship organizations, and only one member with mental health training.<sup>18</sup> The MSD Commission included no people of color as voting members. When students tried to engage in the process and provide their testimony, the MSD Commission ended its hearing before the public testimony portion had been scheduled.<sup>19</sup>

Despite finding significant failures in the provision of special education services to the perpetrator of the mass shooting and recognizing the need for closer examination of the mental health issues, the MSD Commission failed to provide meaningful recommendations to address these issues. Instead, it focused on its area of expertise: policing.

The Florida Legislature has largely adopted the MSD Commission's recommendations, at significant expense to Florida's taxpayers and students. It provided a total of \$225.5 million in FY 2018-19 to embed police officers or armed personnel in schools. More was provided to harden schools with gates, bulletproof glass and security cameras and



to surveil social media and track students as potential threats.

Recognizing the power of prevention, safe schools funding can be used for after-school programs, behavior-driven intervention programs, bullying intervention, and suicide prevention, and historically it was. Today, however, 98% of the state safe schools funding pays for police officers.

Today, students in Florida's schools are more likely to interact with law enforcement at school than a nurse, a social worker or a psychologist.

Two years after Parkland, the amount spent to place police officers in schools only grows, eclipsing funding streams for mental health support in schools.<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, overall spending at schools largely remained relatively stagnant, despite this increased spending on policing.<sup>21</sup>

It's important to note that these funds are only state funds - an additional \$157.6 million from local budgets was also spent to fund police in schools in 2018-19.<sup>22</sup> Today, students in Florida's schools are more likely to interact with law enforcement at school than a nurse, a social worker or a psychologist.

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#### State Funding for School Safety

	FY2018-19	FY2019-20	FY2020-21 Request <sup>23</sup>
Facility Security/ School Hardening	\$98,962,286	\$50,000,000	\$50,000,000
Police Officers	\$161,956,019	\$180,000,000	\$181,416,764
Armed Staff	\$67,500,000	\$500,000	\$500,000
Mental Health	\$69,237,286	\$75,000,000	\$100,000,000



# What do police in schools *actually* do?

The only given when a police officer is placed in a school in Florida is that they have the power to arrest students. Their role varies from school to school, and is often at odds with the purported rationale for posting them at schools. Like many states, Florida fails to have a uniform state policy on just what an officer working in a school should do or what training they should have before they work with our kids.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, the Florida Department of Education provides no guidance to schools or districts on appropriate school policing policies or policies related to arresting students in public schools.<sup>25</sup>

While the justification for Florida's school policing mandate was to protect students from mass shootings, there is very little evidence that integrating police into schools makes schools safe.<sup>26</sup> In the aftermath of the mass shooting at Columbine High School, the federal and state governments provided grants to fund police in schools, which drove the expansion of school policing.<sup>27</sup> However, a study of all school shootings since the Columbine tragedy found that the presence of law enforcement at a school did not predict lower casualties.<sup>28</sup> Ultimately, when asked what schools could do to prevent future school shootings, only 8% of officers working in schools said use armed security staff or police officers.<sup>29</sup>

Part of the reason for this is that police working in schools spend their

time policing normal adolescent misbehavior, not facing high-risk situations like an armed attack. Thus, the MSD Commission found that for the officer stationed at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School during the attack, decades of experience policing schools “may have contributed to his inadequate response to [the] shooting.”<sup>30</sup>

School administrations see police officers as another resource to manage behavior in an otherwise under-resourced environment. Surveys of Florida school districts on their use of police officers from 2000 through 2012 indicate that districts cited student disrespect toward teachers as one of the top three critical issues for school safety.<sup>31</sup> For a couple years, students considered “disrespectful” were cited as a critical safety issue more often than controlling access to campus.<sup>32</sup>

Lines between discipline and security have been further blurred by the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) advocating for police working in schools to adopt a “triad role” of teacher, informal counselor/mentor, and law enforcement officer despite there being exceptionally limited training requirements across the country preparing them for these roles.<sup>33</sup> Only 41% of surveyed police officers in schools reported that their primary role involved law enforcement.<sup>34</sup> Despite the fact that NASRO states that police officers should not be involved in disciplinary decision-making,<sup>35</sup> seven percent see their primary role as disciplinarian. Only 17% reported engaging in mentoring and just 2% reported teaching.<sup>36</sup>

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There is no evidence that officers in schools are trained to be counselors, teachers, or even to police children or teens.

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When it comes to mentoring, there is evidence that police officers approach their work in schools as a sort of ambassador, shaping students’ perceptions of law enforcement generally, “teaching students that police are to be trusted and used as a resource, and that negative interactions with police (including the arrest of a loved one) are the result of an individual’s criminality.”<sup>37</sup> This can be especially troubling for youth of color who have personally had negative interactions with police.

Florida largely leaves how officers working in schools should be trained, and what they should do while at schools, to local discretion. State law requires only that officers working in schools complete mental health crisis intervention training.<sup>38</sup> While the Attorney General’s Office offers training for school resource officers on the “basic knowledge and skills necessary to implement crime prevention programming in a school setting,” the state offers no recognized state certification for school resource officers, and there is no requirement for officers to complete this training in order to work in schools or be called “school resource officers.”<sup>39</sup>

There is no evidence that officers in schools are trained to be counselors, teachers, or even to police children or teens. In one survey, only a

quarter of police officers stationed at schools reported having any experience working with youth before being placed in a school.<sup>40</sup> In another, despite reporting that more than a third of incidents they responded to involved a student receiving special education services, only 59% had received training related to special education students.<sup>41</sup> Despite this lack of training and expertise, officers often take a leading role in deciding how to respond to youth misbehavior.

Police officers are also being relied on for youth mental health. The Baker Act is a law intended to require a person with a mental illness to be evaluated in emergency situations when they pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to themselves or others if not immediately taken to a psychiatric hospital.<sup>42</sup> In such situations, a court, specified medical and mental health professionals, and police can initiate an involuntary 72-hour hold for examination. Evidence shows, however, that the Baker Act is increasingly being used on school children who make jokes, act out, exhibit normal manifestations of a known disability, or express ordinary sadness. This has had devastating results, including trauma and abuse, for these children, as young as 6, and their families.<sup>43</sup>

Because subjecting someone to an involuntary psychiatric examination and hold is so serious, not even all social workers have the authority to use the Baker Act.<sup>44</sup> Even school psychologists, with advanced degrees and years of experience in mental health assessment and crisis response have yet to be authorized in statute despite Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) recommendations to do so.<sup>45</sup> Clinical social workers must have a master's degree in social work, a passing score on a national exam, and two years of experience working under a licensed clinical social worker to use the Baker Act.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, there are no prerequisites for police officers to handcuff a child and have them committed.



Over the last 15 years, the use of the Baker Act on children has more than doubled, with the largest increase among kids 11 to 13 years old.<sup>47</sup> A DCF analysis found that police officers initiated more than 68% of involuntary examinations of youth in fiscal year 2017-18.<sup>48</sup> Although available data is limited, we know that children were subjected to involuntary examinations more than 36,000 times that year,<sup>49</sup> which DCF found was likely an undercount due to inadequacies in data collection.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, at least 21 youth were subjected to involuntary examinations more than 10 times each, and police officers initiated 88% of these examinations. Nearly a quarter of these examinations were initiated at school.<sup>51</sup>

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When there are no student support resources, and there is an officer with no clear role and no clear threat to respond to, officers end up being the person to respond when teachers cannot quickly address student outbursts.

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The roles police are taking in schools have significant implications for student and parental rights:

- » Parents do not have to provide consent for their child to be subjected to an involuntary examination under the Baker Act, and are powerless to help their children once it has been initiated.<sup>52</sup>
- » Parents do not have to be notified before police interrogate a child at school.<sup>53</sup>
- » Although officers must stop an interrogation if the child tells them that they want to talk to their parents first, officers don't have to tell the child they have this right.<sup>54</sup>
- » Police officers only have to attempt to notify parents when they take a child into custody so the parents know where the child is.<sup>55</sup>
- » Although police officers have to read children their rights when they are taken into custody, school staff does not have to do this, even when the police officer is in the room during an interrogation.<sup>56</sup>
- » Parents, and students, may lose their right to consent before their records are shared with law enforcement and others.<sup>57</sup>

It comes as no surprise then that schools where police officers are stationed have more student arrests on campus.<sup>58</sup> Often, these arrests are for misbehavior better handled by teachers and administrators.<sup>59</sup> During the 2018-19 school year, 1,129 arrests were made in schools for “disorderly conduct”—nearly four times as many as made outside of schools. When there are no student support resources, and there is an officer with no clear role and no clear threat to respond to, officers end up being the person to respond when teachers cannot quickly address student outbursts.

What is more hidden is that stationing a police officer in a school fundamentally changes the school climate. Trends suggest that discipline increases, with more kids being pushed out of school through suspensions and expulsions.<sup>60</sup> Even when a memorandum of understanding dictates that officers should stay out of discipline, they shape how



student behavior is managed.<sup>61</sup> Their presence is associated with decreased feelings of school connectedness among students<sup>62</sup>—a variable considered critical to school climate and ensuring students report threats.<sup>63</sup>

A key issue is that police officers have nearly unlimited discretion to arrest even the youngest students. In a study of how they use that discretion, 77% of officers reported arresting students “to calm them down.” The majority has also arrested students to show them that actions have consequences (68%) or because a teacher wanted them arrested for a minor offense (55%).<sup>64</sup>

Ultimately, the research consistently shows that the presence of law enforcement negatively impacts school climate:

- » The presence of law enforcement shifts school culture and practices in ways that result in more punitive environments.<sup>65</sup>
- » The presence of law enforcement is predictive of higher rates of student arrests,<sup>66</sup> and contributes to disproportionate arrests of Black and brown students and students with disabilities.<sup>67</sup>
- » Most studies show that school-based law enforcement are related to higher rates of exclusionary discipline.<sup>68</sup>
- » There is evidence that the presence of law enforcement in schools may increase students’ fear, heightening their perceived need for law enforcement to protect them from objectively unlikely to occur threats.<sup>69</sup>

The impact of school policing has never been evenly felt. Since the earliest programs, police have been more likely to be stationed at schools that serve predominantly low-income students of color.<sup>70</sup> Unlike how they approach predominately white schools, police stationed at these schools are more likely to see students as suspects.<sup>71</sup>


This exacerbates the consequences of an already unjust system. From early on, youth of color are more likely to be seen as troublemakers, regardless of their actual behavior.<sup>72</sup> For example, a study of Pinellas County discipline found that more than half of suspended Black students were suspended for subjective offenses, like not cooperating, class disruption, insubordination or disrespect.<sup>73</sup> Black students were four and a half times as likely to be arrested at school for disorderly conduct than their white classmates.<sup>74</sup> For Black girls, the disparity was even larger. Despite white girls’ arrest rate for disorderly conduct increasing 23%, Black girls were arrested nearly 6 times as often.<sup>75</sup> Once such treatment begins, it is difficult to undo the harm. Black students and other students of color internalize a role as the “bad kids” in class and society, reinforcing a self-fulfilling prophecy.<sup>76</sup>

# The *human cost of policing* in Florida schools

**In an effort to protect students, Florida enacted a law that increased students' chances of being arrested at school.** The law requiring police or security personnel in every school resulted in the near doubling of the number of officers stationed at schools in Florida<sup>77</sup> and brought an 8% increase in the student arrest rate.<sup>78</sup> This stands in mark contrast not only to past trends but the continued decrease in both juvenile and adult arrest rates in the community.

In addition to the serious disruption to a child's life and education, arresting a juvenile has serious, long term impacts. In Florida, juvenile records are not automatically expunged until age 21 at the earliest.<sup>79</sup> Some remain until age 26. These records are considered in a young adult's first applications for a job, to further their college or fund their education, and housing, etc. Juveniles who've been arrested are less likely to graduate high school and to go to secondary school,<sup>80</sup> more likely to be arrested in the future,<sup>81</sup> and more likely to be incarcerated as an adult.<sup>82</sup> These consequences are not warranted - or even logical - given the reality that youth largely grow out of delinquent behavior without intervention.<sup>83</sup> Instead, these interruptions and burdens make it harder for these kids to successfully age out of delinquency.

The percent of youth arrests that happened in school, as opposed to in the community, had been declining as more schools adopted pre-arrest



diversion programs. After the state mandated school policing, that trend reversed, with 20% of the youth arrests in fiscal year 2018-19 happening at school.<sup>84</sup>

Even our youngest students have not been immune to these consequences. The arrest of 6-year-old Kaia Rolle at school forced Florida to face the harsh reality that our current laws do not have a minimum age of arrest. In the past five years, police officers arrested elementary-aged kids (between the ages of five and ten) 2,164 times.<sup>85</sup> In fiscal year 2018-19, police officers arrested elementary-aged kids 345 times, including an arrest of a five year old and 5 arrests of six-year olds.<sup>86</sup>

Racial disparities persisted in these rates: Black kids continue to be more than twice as likely as their white peers to be arrested at school.<sup>87</sup> One development identified by Florida's experiment in mandated school policing is that arrest rates for white students are now increasing at a higher rate than Black students, and that police presence is driving this.<sup>88</sup> Yet, even with a 20% increase in the arrest rate for white students, the racial disparity in arrests persisted.

One criticism of the past research showing increased school policing is correlated with increased negative student outcomes is the notion that schools' motivation for adding police officers may explain the increase in negative outcomes. For example, perhaps the school was already experiencing increased violence and administrators felt law enforcement presence was needed.

New research on Florida's experiment in mandating school policing illustrates that even when all schools faced the same mandate, negative outcomes increased.<sup>89</sup>

Black kids continue to be more than twice as likely as their white peers to be arrested at school.

The study, which examined data from 2014-15 and 2018-19, found that:

- » The presence of law enforcement was related to a greater frequency of school arrests (40-82% more at the school-level). This relationship existed at elementary, middle and high school levels.
- » The presence of law enforcement predicted greater numbers of behavioral incidents being reported to law enforcement, particularly for less severe infractions and among middle schoolers.
- » There was little consistent evidence that the presence of law enforcement decreased the number of behavioral incidents occurring, indicating that school-based law enforcement were not necessarily making schools safer.

These findings persisted even when differences between schools and trends that affected all schools were controlled. The bottom line is that when you integrate a police officer into a school, the number of kids referred to police officers, and ultimately arrested, increases. Meanwhile, the number of behavioral incidents at the school largely remains the same - showing the school is no more calm or safe than before the officer's arrival.





# Recommendations

This summer's civil uprising against police brutality and the misuse of the state's police power against its people has highlighted the need for a more nuanced, purposeful approach to public safety. School districts across the country are reassessing the efficacy of integrating police officers into schools and reweighing its costs and benefits. The impacts of COVID-19 on our schools and budgets cannot be overstated. Schools already struggling to provide the resources necessary for students to learn are now struggling to provide the resources necessary to protect student health. Students, meanwhile, will be bringing the stress and trauma of living during a worldwide pandemic to the classroom.

## ..... Repeal the school policing mandate

The Legislature must **repeal the state mandate** requiring police officers or security personnel on every campus. It is already clear that Florida will need to reduce spending due to the impacts COVID-19 has had on our state's economy. Policymakers must examine the cost, both fiscal and human, of school policing and account for the consequences of adding Tasers, handcuffs and guns to schools that struggle to provide enough textbooks and, now, hand sanitizer.

## Mitigate the consequences of school policing

The MSD Commission must consider the expertise and experience of directly impacted students, educators and experts in mental health to ensure recommendations on school safety are balanced to better serve the needs of students.

The Legislature, and local policymakers, can mitigate the harms of expanded school policing by passing **minimum requirements** for training of police in schools, a **minimum age for arrest** and **limitations on the use of force**, including tasers and pepper spray, against children.

The employment of **student support professionals**, such as counselors, social workers and school psychologists, in adequate numbers can prevent unnecessary referrals to law enforcement.

Until the state mandate is repealed, local and state policymakers should establish **clear training requirements and accountability measures** for officers working in schools. Officers should also be assigned **clear duties** to ensure their mandate is controlling access to campus, not policing the hallways. Policymakers must **address the overuse of Baker Acts** on children, ensure parental and child rights are respected in the process, and pass legislation mandating disaggregated data collection and data transparency on Baker Act use in schools.

School districts should adopt **clear student codes of conduct** with clear consequences for specified behavior that limit the involvement of police officers to situations posing immediate safety risks. Although the Legislature revised the state's zero tolerance law, school districts continue to have discretion to define which acts pose a threat and require zero tolerance and which acts do not pose a threat to safety. Likewise, the law is very clear that threat assessment teams can use alternatives to referral to law enforcement and that zero tolerance policies may not be applied to petty acts of misconduct.<sup>90</sup> School districts should develop school-and community-based diversion programs to address disciplinary issues and limit undue student contact with the justice system.

School districts should adopt **effective discipline policies and practices** that teach and reinforce positive behavior. Districts should provide teachers and staff with effective behavior management tools and educate them about when it is appropriate to call the police on their students and when it is not.

Schools should teach students about their rights in police encounters and avoid blurring the lines between law enforcement and school staff when investigating, searching and interrogating students.

# Endnotes

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# Appendix





# The Expanding Presence of Law Enforcement in Florida Schools

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## Research Report 2020

F. Chris Curran, PhD, *University of Florida*



## Research Report

# The Expanding Presence of Law Enforcement in Florida Schools

2020

**F. Chris Curran, PhD**

Associate Professor and Director of the UF Education Policy Research Center

### Abstract

The presence of law enforcement in public schools has been a common security practice in the state of Florida for several decades. Following the tragic 2018 school shooting in Parkland, FL, the state passed a law requiring all public schools to either have law enforcement or other armed personnel present. Drawing on state-wide data for the school years 2014-15 through 2018-19, this report examined the relationship between law enforcement in schools and a number of outcomes including reports of behavioral incidents to the state, incidents reported to law enforcement, school arrests, and exclusionary discipline. This analysis used statistical techniques that controlled for both observable characteristics of districts and schools as well as unobserved characteristics that were fixed over time. Findings suggest that the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act significantly increased the presence of law enforcement in schools, particularly in elementary schools. The presence of law enforcement in schools was related to increases in the number of behavioral incidents reported to the state, the number of such incidents reported to law enforcement, and student arrests. The results suggest a need to reconsider whether law enforcement should be present in schools, and, if they are, how they can be implemented in a way that minimizes unnecessary exposure of students to law enforcement and arrests.

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## Executive Summary

This research report presents findings from a state-wide analysis of law enforcement in Florida schools. It examines data from a five year period between the 2014-15 and 2018-19 school years, including the years before and after the 2018 passage of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act. The analysis used a number of statistical techniques, including both district and school fixed effects, to account for underlying differences in districts/schools that had greater or fewer law enforcement in schools.

### Key Findings

1. The number of law enforcement in Florida schools nearly doubled, and the number of Florida schools served by law enforcement increased by 40% between 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years.
2. The increase in law enforcement in schools was driven primarily by an increased presence in elementary schools, which had an approximately 56% increase in law enforcement presence between 2017-18 and 2018-19.
3. Between 2017-18 and 2018-19, there were increases statewide in the number of behavioral incidents reported to the state and to law enforcement, particularly for threats/intimidation, drug related incidents, and tobacco related incidents.
4. The presence of law enforcement in schools was related to a greater frequency of school arrests (40-82% more at the school-level). Surprisingly, this relationship was most consistent among white students.
5. The presence of law enforcement in schools predicted greater numbers of behavioral incidents being reported to law enforcement, particularly for less severe infractions and among middle schoolers.
6. There was little consistent evidence that the presence of law enforcement decreased the number of behavioral incidents occurring, indicating that school-based law enforcement were not necessarily making schools safer.
7. The presence of law enforcement was not consistently related to exclusionary school discipline such as suspensions.

### Policy Implications

1. School districts should reconsider whether law enforcement should be present in schools, keeping in mind that state law limits alternatives.
2. The state requirement to have armed personnel in schools should be revisited with an eye toward returning control to local school districts and schools to determine how best to ensure a safe learning environment.
3. School districts and law enforcement agencies should adopt clear policies that restrict the ability to arrest to a limited set of serious infractions and prohibit arrest of young students.
4. If present, law enforcement in schools should be trained in conflict resolution, in ways to reduce implicit bias and disproportionate minority contact, and in alternatives to the use of force or arrest.

## Introduction

The presence of law enforcement in schools has become an increasingly common feature of public schools in America. From 2005 to 2015, the percentage of public schools nationwide with law enforcement present at least part time increased by about 33% such that, as of 2017-18, around half of all public schools had a law enforcement presence (Correa & Diliberti, 2020; Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). Florida's rates of law enforcement presence in schools were similar, with about 48% of schools in FL reporting school-based law enforcement in the 2013-14 school year (Civil Rights Data Collection, 2014).

In the wake of the tragic 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, and several others across the nation, many states passed laws that served to further increase the likelihood that schools have law enforcement present. In particular, in Florida, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (Act), passed in 2018, requires that all public schools host either a law enforcement officer, an armed staff member, or an armed private security guard (Florida Statutes §1006.12 2018). As a result, schools across the state have been actively working to increase the presence of law enforcement in schools.

This trend towards greater use of law enforcement in schools has occurred despite research that finds a generally negative relationship between the presence of law enforcement in schools and student outcomes. For example, prior work has found that the presence of law enforcement is predictive of higher rates of student arrest and greater use of exclusionary discipline like suspensions (Fisher & Hennessy, 2016; Owens, 2017; Weisburst, 2019). This may be because, as qualitative ethnographies have suggested, the presence of law enforcement shifts school culture and practices in ways that result in more punitive environments (Kupchik, 2010; Nolan, 2011).

While such qualitative work and some recent quantitative work point to causal relationships, it is often difficult to disentangle whether the presence of law enforcement in schools is causing these negative outcomes or is merely a reflection of law enforcement being placed in settings where negative experiences like arrests and suspensions are more common (Owens, 2017; Weisburst, 2019). In Florida, recently passed state law requires schools to either have law enforcement or other armed personnel present. This law, which has prompted an expansion of law enforcement in schools, presents a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of law enforcement in schools on student outcomes.

This research report documents the increasing presence of law enforcement in Florida public schools and explores how law enforcement presence relates to a number of student outcomes including the number of behavioral incidents reported to the state, behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement, school arrests, and exclusionary discipline such as suspensions. This report documents substantial increases in the presence of law enforcement in Florida schools, particularly elementary schools. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the presence of law enforcement may be contributing to increased reports of behavioral incidents to law enforcement and increased arrests, particularly of white students. The results do not, however, find consistent evidence that law enforcement in schools result in greater use of exclusionary discipline, a finding that contrasts with some prior research.

## Methodology

The analysis leveraged longitudinal district and school-level data to compare outcomes for districts/schools that had law enforcement to those that did not (or had fewer) between the 2014-15 and 2018-19 school years. The analysis took advantage of the 2018 Act that required schools to adopt one of several school security options (including law enforcement in schools) as a source of plausibly less biased variation in the placement of law enforcement in schools. By comparing frequency of behavioral incidents reported to the state, reports of incidents to law enforcement, school arrests, and discipline before and after the passage of the Act for districts/schools that added law enforcement, this analysis provides insights into the potential effects of law enforcement presence on schools and students.

### Data

This analysis leveraged both district and school-level data on the presence of law enforcement in schools as well as multiple measures of student outcomes. Analyses were conducted separately with the school district as the unit of analysis (district-level) and with the school as the unit of analysis (school-level). While the school-level analysis had the advantage of being able to more accurately link the presence of law enforcement in a school to outcomes in that particular school, data on placement of law enforcement at the school-level were not available for all schools in the state. The district-level analysis, in comparison, covered all districts in the state, for the entire five year span. Both the district and school-level datasets were constructed using publicly available data from the FL Departments of Education (DOE) and Juvenile Justice (DJJ), school districts, and local law enforcement agencies.

**Independent Variables (Law Enforcement Presence in Schools).** The key independent variable in the analysis was the presence of law enforcement in a district or school. For the district-level analysis, data on the presence of law enforcement were drawn from the FL DOE's annual Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditures Report. These publicly available annual reports provide details on the number of schools in each district served by law enforcement as well as the number of law enforcement officers in each district (which can differ given that some schools have multiple officers and some officers cover multiple schools). Both the number of schools served and number of officers are also disaggregated by school level (elementary, middle, high). For the purpose of the district-level analysis, the presence of law enforcement was primarily operationalized as the number of schools served by school-based law enforcement, though in additional analyses included in the appendix, presence of law enforcement was operationalized as the number of school-based law enforcement in the district.

For the school-level analysis, data on the presence of law enforcement in schools were compiled through public records requests to school districts and local law enforcement agencies. Specifically, each school district in the state was asked to indicate which schools were covered by law enforcement for the school years 2014-15 through 2018-19. For school districts that were unresponsive to the public records requests, similar requests were made of the local law enforcement agencies located in the district's county. While not all districts or agencies provided data on the presence of school-based law enforcement, the final school-level dataset included information on 2,245 schools from 56 school districts (approximately 65% of schools in the state representing 84% of the school districts). The full list of school districts for which there was school-level information on law enforcement presence is provided in the

appendix (see Appendix A). For the school-level analysis, the presence of school-based law enforcement was operationalized as a binary indicator for whether a school was served by school-based law enforcement (either full-time or part-time) as well as, in specifications included in appendices, as the number of school-based law enforcement present in a given school.

[Dependent Variables \(Behavioral Incidents, Reports to Law Enforcement, Arrests, and Discipline\)](#). The key dependent variables for this analysis were number of behavioral incidents reported to the state, number of incidents reported to law enforcement, number of arrests at school, and number of exclusionary discipline responses.

The Florida Department of Education reports the number of behavioral incidents occurring in schools at the school-level as part of the annual School Environmental Safety Incident Reporting (SESIR) system. As a part of the SESIR, schools report the number of behavioral incidents overall and within a number of categories. The SESIR includes 26 different infraction types that are categorized into four levels based on severity. Level 1 offenses are the most serious and include aggravated battery, arson, homicide, kidnapping, and sexual battery. Level 2 offenses include burglary, drug sale/distribution, physical attack, robbery, sexual assault, and weapons possession. Level 3 offenses include major disruption on campus, drug use/possession, fighting, hazing, larceny/theft, sexual harassment, other sexual offenses, threat/intimidation, trespassing, vandalism, and other major offenses. Finally, Level 4 includes alcohol, bullying, harassment, and tobacco. Importantly, though organized in levels, all SESIR incidents are considered “serious”. For the purpose of this study, I estimate relationships between law enforcement presence and the overall count of incidents reported to the state as well as counts of incidents aggregated to each of the four levels.

In addition to information on the frequency of particular behavioral incidents reported to the state, the SESIR also includes counts of the number of behavioral incidents that are reported to law enforcement. Incidents are considered reported to law enforcement if an official action was taken by a school-based law enforcement or other law enforcement officer. Such official actions could include assigning a case number, filing a report, conducting an investigation, issuing a civil citation, or making an arrest. Importantly, the category of reported to law enforcement does not necessarily include incidents in which school personnel merely consulted with or notified law enforcement. As with the behavioral incidents, the behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement are also categorized by the same four level system, ranging from severe (Level 1) to less severe (Level 4) infractions. This report used both the overall number of incidents reported to law enforcement as well as the number by level (1-4) as outcomes. For district-level analysis, the number of incidents was aggregated to the district level.

As noted, incidents reported to law enforcement do not necessarily result in arrest. Consequently, the analysis also included school arrests of juveniles as a distinct outcome. District and school arrests were compiled from public data available from the Florida DJJ. The FL DJJ provides data on juvenile arrests occurring both within schools and in the community through the Delinquency in Florida’s Schools Dashboard. For the purpose of this analysis, arrests occurring outside of school, in private schools, or in non K-12 settings were removed as were any arrests that were identified as occurring in an unknown location or school. The arrest data were then aggregated to the district and school levels to provide measures of the number

of juvenile arrests at public schools. Frequency of arrests were calculated both in aggregate and by student race.

The final set of dependent variables in this analysis were number of students who experienced exclusionary discipline practices. School districts report annually to the state the number of students who were subject to out-of-school suspension (OSS), in-school suspension (ISS), and a number of other disciplinary outcomes both in aggregate and by student race/ethnicity. This analysis focused on the number of students who experienced OSS and ISS, both in aggregate and disaggregated by racial/ethnic subgroup.

### Control Variables

The analysis also included a number of observable covariates as control variables. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics on each of these control variables for the district-level and school-level analyses respectively. Of this full list of control variables, individual regressions omitted certain variables in order to reduce multi-collinearity and ensure variance inflation factors of less than 10. Specifically, the district-level analysis omitted the proportion of white students, total number of schools in a district, and number of schools by level due to high levels of multi-collinearity. The school-level analysis omitted the proportion of white students. As shown, the school-level dataset, while not including all schools in the state, largely reflected the district averages.

### Methods

This analysis estimated the relationship between law enforcement in schools and the beforementioned outcomes using a regression framework with controls for observable characteristics of districts and schools as well as the use of year as well as district and/or school fixed effects. The fixed effects approach allowed for adjustments for unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of districts and schools as well as temporal trends affecting all districts and schools in the state. Furthermore, by leveraging the change of state law in 2018, this analysis exploited variation induced by the Act that prompted districts and schools to expand the use of law enforcement in schools.

The estimation strategy relied on an ordinary least squares regression model with panel longitudinal data at the school district, and, in other models, school-level. The general specification took the following form:

$$\text{Equation 1. } y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{LawEnforcement}_{st} + \beta_2 \theta_{st} + \beta_3 \mu_s + \beta_4 \lambda_t + e$$

Where  $y$  represents the outcome of interest (described above and modeled separately for each outcome) for district or school  $s$  at time  $t$ . *LawEnforcement* represents the key independent variable of interest (number of schools served by law enforcement in the district-level models and, for school-level models, whether law enforcement was present in the school).  $\theta$  represents a vector of observable district and school characteristics such as enrollment, racial composition, socio-economic status of students served, and so forth. The  $\mu$  term represents a series of academic year fixed effects. Finally,  $\lambda$  represents a set of either school district or school fixed effects that implicitly control for time-invariant characteristics of districts or schools as well as their surrounding communities. The interest in these models was in estimating  $\beta_1$  which represents the relationship between law enforcement presence in districts or schools and the outcomes of interest after accounting for other factors in the model.



While various specifications and estimation strategies were used and are reported in the sensitivity and robustness analysis section, the primary models reported in this analysis used logged versions of the outcome variable for district-level analysis and employed the use of conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression in the case of the school-level analysis. These approaches were used to address the skewed nature of the outcome variables and to address the count nature of the outcome variables. For the district-level analysis, the results can be interpreted as percentage changes in the outcome given the logged version of the outcome. Similarly, for the school-level analysis, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported which can similarly be interpreted in terms of percentage changes in the outcomes.

In addition to this primary model, the analysis also explored potential heterogeneous relationships – such as whether the relationship between law enforcement in schools and outcomes looks different across grade level of schools (elementary, middle, high schools) as well as whether certain outcomes varied based on student race/ethnicity. These subgroup analyses were conducted by modeling versions of Equation 1 that used variants of the dependent variables that were specific to the subgroup (such as the frequency of school arrest of Black students) or restricted observations to those in a particular subgroup (such as estimating the equation separately for elementary, middle, and high schools).

The ideal study would randomly assign law enforcement to schools, allowing for a comparison of outcomes between two groups of schools that were otherwise identical on average. However, given that such random assignment was not logistically or politically feasible, this study attempted to approximate such a comparison through the use of observable control variables, year fixed effects, and district/school fixed effects. The first of these, observable controls, allowed relationships to be adjusted for characteristics of districts and schools such as their size, the racial/ethnic composition of students served, the socio-economic makeup of students served, and the ratios of school personnel to students. Next, the year fixed effects controlled for any time trends that affected all districts/schools in the state equally. For example, if all districts/schools in the state responded to the Parkland tragedy by increasing their use of arrests or increasing their practice of reporting behavioral incidents to the state, these changes would be accounted for by the year fixed effects. Finally, the district and school fixed effects allowed relationships to be adjusted for time-invariant observable and unobservable characteristics of districts/schools, the students they serve, and their surrounding communities. For example, the fixed effects approach controlled for quality of leadership, discipline policies, school climate, curriculum and pedagogical approach as well as characteristics such as community crime to the extent that they remained constant throughout the years of data included in the study. Collectively, these analytic techniques accounted for many potential sources of bias in the estimation of the relationship between law enforcement in schools and outcomes. While they may not entirely remove the possibility of selection bias, they produced estimates that more closely approximated causal estimates of law enforcement's effects on the various outcomes.

## Findings

This section details the findings of the analysis. It begins with a descriptive overview of how the presence of law enforcement in schools in Florida has changed since the 2014-15 school year. It then presents results of the regression models that predict school behavioral incidents as reported to SESIR, the number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement,

the number of school arrests, and the frequency of school discipline. Across each, results are presented from both the district-level and school-level analyses.

Overall, the findings of the report show that the presence of law enforcement in schools in Florida are above the national average and have been increasing, particularly in elementary schools, as a result of the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act. The results suggest that this increased presence of law enforcement in schools has resulted in no decreases in reports of behavioral incidents in school and a greater number of reports of such incidents to law enforcement. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the presence of law enforcement increases juvenile arrests at school. Finally, the results show that the presence of law enforcement in schools does not reduce the frequency of school disciplinary incidents (i.e. suspensions).

## Descriptive Statistics

### The Presence of Law Enforcement in Florida Schools is Increasing

Nationally, the presence of law enforcement in public schools has increased significantly over the last several decades, reflecting an increasing use of law enforcement approaches in school settings. This trend towards placing law enforcement in schools has been particularly evident in Florida. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, during the 2014-15 school year, school districts reported 1,430.31 law enforcement officers serving 2,519 schools (reflecting many law enforcement officers being shared across schools). By the 2018-19 school year, districts would report 3,638.5 law enforcement officers serving 3,235 schools. While some schools continued to share law enforcement, these figures reflect a trend toward schools, particularly elementary schools, having their own dedicated law enforcement officer and for some schools, particularly larger high schools, to have multiple law enforcement officers.




Figure 1. Number of FL schools served by school law enforcement from 2014-15 to 2018-19

Source: School district reports to state Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditure Reports




Figure 2. Number of school law enforcement in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19

Source: School district reports to state Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditure Reports

Tables 3 and 4 show levels of law enforcement coverage at the district-level and school-level respectively. As is evident, the increasing presence of law enforcement in Florida schools was driven largely by the 2018 passage of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (represented by the vertical red line in Figures 1 and 2), which required either law enforcement, armed private security, or armed staff in schools. The number of law enforcement reported in schools almost doubled (increased by about 97%) between the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years, from 1,844.5 to 3,638.5. Similarly, between the same years, the number of schools with law enforcement present increased by about 40% from 2,309 schools to 3,235. The relatively larger increase in the number of law enforcement in schools relative to the number of schools with law enforcement reflects the tendency for elementary schools to move from shared law enforcement to a dedicated officer as well as the trend toward larger schools housing multiple law enforcement officers.

With a few exceptions, the increased presence of law enforcement as a result of the 2018 Act was generally experienced across all districts in the state. Figure 3 shows the number of school-based law enforcement per 1,000 students enrolled by district as well as the change in the number per 1,000 students between the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years.




Figure 3. Change in ratio of law enforcement in schools per 1,000 students from 2017-18 to 2018-19 school years

Source: School district reports to state Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditure Reports

As is clear from the figure, most districts experienced substantial increases in law enforcement presence. There were eleven districts that decreased the ratio, with only three of these representing substantially sized decreases. It is also worth noting that some districts reported potentially suspect numbers of school-based law enforcement to the state. For example, Santa Rosa County reported substantially more school-based law enforcement than schools, particularly at the elementary school level. In some other cases, such as Duval County, there is evidence that the numbers reported as school-based law enforcement may include individuals acting as school safety assistants – armed individuals trained by the Sheriff’s Office who wear uniforms but lack full arrest powers. For the purpose of the district-level analysis presented here, the data was used as reported by districts; however, the school-level analysis provides more precise identification of sworn law enforcement’s presence.

### Elementary Schools Experienced the Largest Increase in Law Enforcement Presence

The overall upward trend in the presence of law enforcement in Florida schools hides the fact that this increase has been disproportionately felt by the state’s youngest learners. When disaggregating the presence of law enforcement by school level (elementary, middle, or high), it is clear that the increased presence of law enforcement driven by the 2018 Act has been almost exclusively driven by increases in law enforcement in elementary school settings.




Figure 4. Number of FL schools served by school law enforcement from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by school level

Source: School district reports to state Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditure Reports




Figure 5. Number of school law enforcement in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by school level

Source: School district reports to state Safe Schools Appropriation Expenditure Reports

As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the largest increases in law enforcement presence have occurred in elementary schools. During the 2014-15 school year, there were 272.75 law enforcement officers in elementary schools in the state of Florida. By the 2018-19 school year, there would be 1,830 law enforcement officers in elementary schools. Between the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years, the number of law enforcement in elementary schools would increase by

almost 221% or more than triple. Similarly, the number of elementary schools with law enforcement present would increase from 1,164 in 2014-15 to 1,754 in 2018-19. From 2017-18 to 2018-19, the number of elementary schools with law enforcement would increase by 56%. These trends reflect elementary schools in the state without law enforcement adding them and many elementary schools that had previously shared a law enforcement officer with another school moving to have full-time law enforcement coverage.

As will be shown next, these increases in the presence of law enforcement in schools largely trended in the same direction as reports of behavioral incidents, reports of behavioral incidents to law enforcement, school arrests, and student discipline during this time period.

### Behavioral Incidents Reported to the State, Reports to Law Enforcement, School Arrests, and Exclusionary Discipline Increased following the 2018 Act

The goal of the 2018 Act was to increase the safety of schools, both to prevent acts of mass school violence such as the tragedy at Parkland but also to generally improve the overall safety of schools. Descriptively, however, data show that trends in reported behavioral incidents, reports to law enforcement, school arrests, and use of exclusionary discipline tended to increase rather than decrease following the Act's 2018 passage. This section describes trends in these outcomes before turning to analyses that explore whether these trends are linked to the presence of law enforcement in schools.

The number of behavioral incidents reported by school districts to SESIR, the state reporting mechanism, increased dramatically from the 2017-18 to 2018-19 school years. As shown in Figure 6, the number of reported behavioral incidents went from 71,159 in 2017-18 to 84,649 in 2018-19, an almost 19% increase in reported incidents. In raw numbers, this reflects an additional 13,490 behavioral incidents reported in Florida schools.




Figure 6. Number of reported behavioral incidents in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years

Source: School district reports to FL DOE




Figure 7. Number of reported behavioral incidents in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by school level

Source: School district reports to FL DOE



The descriptive statistics suggest that this increase in reported behavioral incidents was largely driven by lower level incidents, categorized by the state as Level 3 and Level 4 incidents. As shown in Figure 7, the largest increase was seen in level 4 incidents, which increased by about 74% between 2017-18 and 2018-19. Within levels, however, the increases in reported behavioral incidents were driven by a handful of specific incident types. Specifically, there were meaningful increases in the district averages in the prevalence of bullying, threats/intimidation, drug related incidents, and tobacco related incidents (see Tables 5 and 6). Notably, in 2018-19, districts on average reported about 267 tobacco related incidents, more than doubling the previous year's average of 123. On a positive note, there were several incident types that showed notable decreases including physical attacks which decreased from a 2017-18 district average of 137 incidents to about 125 incidents in 2018-19.

These trends in reported behavioral incidents were largely mirrored by the trends in behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement. Figure 8 shows the number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement by year and Figure 9 shows these disaggregated by level. While only about a third of behavioral incidents reported to the state are reported to law enforcement in any given year, there was nevertheless a notable increase in the number of incidents reported to law enforcement following the 2018 Act. As shown, in 2017-18, there were 23,404 behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement. In the 2018-19 school year, school districts would report 29,275, an approximately 25% increase in the number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement. Notably, this percentage change in the number of incidents reported to law enforcement almost exactly matches the percentage change in the number of behavioral incidents reported to the state. In other words, the proportion of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement appears relatively constant over time, despite increases in both reported behavioral incidents and their reporting to law enforcement.




Figure 8. Number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years

Source: School district reports to FL DOE




Figure 9. Number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by severity level

Source: School district reports to FL DOE

Tables 7 and 8 show district-level and school-level averages of incidents reported to law enforcement. As with the incidents themselves, the increase in incidents reported to law enforcement was largely driven by increases in lower level offenses (Level 3 and 4). In particular, the number of Level 3 offenses increased by 21% between 2017-18 and 2018-19 while the number of Level 4 offenses increased by 73%. This means that schools were reporting significantly more Level 3 and 4 offenses to law enforcement following than 2018 Act than before. Specific increases were seen in the reporting of incidents of drug use/possession (district average of 120.19 in 2018-19 compared to 85.64 in 2017-18), tobacco-nicotine (district average of 52.70 in 2018-19 compared to 23.27 in 2017-18), threats/intimidation (district average of 38.54 in 2018-19 compared to 29.04 in 2017-18), and physical attacks (district average of 20.75 in 2018-19 and 12.70 in 2017-18). The last of these was particularly interesting given that the number of physical attacks reported to the state actually decreased between these two school years, suggesting that more of these incidents may be reported to law enforcement even though fewer are occurring.

With more reported behavioral incidents and more reported to law enforcement, it is perhaps little surprise that there were more arrests at school in 2018-19 than in the year prior (see Tables 9 and 10 for district-level and school-level averages, respectively). The frequency of school arrests had actually been decreasing steadily from 2014-15 to 2016-17 (see Figure 10); however, the trend began turning positive through the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years. While still below the number in 2014-15, there were nearly 8,000 arrests in Florida public schools during the 2018-19 school year. These increases were driven by a leveling out of the number of misdemeanor arrests and an increase in the number of felony arrests in the 2018-19 school year.




Figure 10. Number of public school arrests in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years  
Source: Florida DJJ




Figure 11. Number of public school arrests in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by race/ethnicity  
Source: Florida DJJ

Interestingly, this recent uptick in school arrests has been largely due to increases in the number of white students being arrested at school (Figure 11). As shown, the number of white students arrested at school increased to 2,863 students in 2018-19 from only 2,393 the year before, an almost 20% increase. The number of arrests of Hispanic students also increased between 2017-18 and 2018-19, growing by about 24%. This contrasts with the number of arrests of Black students which has shown a steady decline over the time period examined. It is important to note, however, that Black students still remain grossly over-represented in school arrests. This is clear given that the number of Black students arrested remains much higher than white students, despite there being fewer Black students enrolled in Florida public schools. In other words, there is clear evidence that racial disparities in school arrests persist in Florida.

Finally, along with increases in school arrests, there were concurrent increases between 2017-18 and 2018-19 in the use of exclusionary discipline practices following several years of declines (see Tables 11 and 12). Figures 12 and 13 show the number of OSS and ISS reported by school districts, both in total and disaggregated by student race/ethnicity. As shown, ISS is slightly more common than OSS, but, combined there were over 343,000 suspensions during the 2018-19 school year. While Black and Hispanic students are over-represented in both OSS and ISS relative to their proportion of students in the state, the trends in suspensions across race/ethnicity were generally consistent over the time period examined.




Figure 12. Number of out-of-school suspensions in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years overall and by race

Source: School district reports to FL DOE




Figure 13. Number of in-school suspensions in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years overall and by race

Source: School district reports to FL DOE

Among other changes in school discipline rates, state data also revealed a significant increase in the number of districts reporting the use of physical restraint on students. Figure 14 shows the number of physical restraints per year. As shown, reports of physical restraints in

2018-19 were over four times as large as those in the prior school year. While it is unclear what accounts for this substantial increase in the reporting of the use of physical restraint, the trend is particularly concerning. It is possible that this increase merely reflects a change in reporting practices among school districts. The next section explores whether these descriptive trends in reported behaviors, reporting to law enforcement, arrests, and discipline are linked to the presence of law enforcement or reflect other, unrelated trends.

## Law Enforcement Presence and Student Outcomes

From the descriptive statistics, it is clear that the increasing presence of law enforcement in schools has been correlated with an increased frequency of a number of undesirable student outcomes including increased reports of behavioral incidents, increased number of incidents reported to law enforcement, increased school arrests, and increased use of exclusionary discipline. An important question, however, is whether these relationships are driven by the presence of law enforcement in schools or by other factors. In other words, are law enforcement in schools causing increases in these outcomes?

Results of the regression analyses with observable controls and fixed effects provide more evidence to answer this question. As described previously, the analytic technique accounts for differences in school contexts that are observable, for time trends that affect all districts/schools in the state, and for fixed characteristics of districts/schools over time. The results presented in this section, then, more closely approximate the effect of law enforcement on each of the outcomes. I begin by discussing the relationship between law enforcement and reported behavioral incidents in schools and then present results for behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement, school arrests, and student discipline. For each outcome, results are presented both from the district-level analysis, which covers all districts in the state, and for the school-level sample, which covers schools in approximately 84% of districts in the state. As will be shown, results are generally consistent between both. Finally, this section concludes with a description of a set of sensitivity and robustness checks.

## Law Enforcement Presence and Reported Behavioral Incidents in Schools

The presence of law enforcement in schools was generally predictive of a greater number of reports of behavioral incidents in schools. At the district-level, the number of schools served by law enforcement was a statistically significant predictor of the number of reported behavioral incidents, both in models without district fixed effects and with their inclusion. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 13, each additional school in a district served by a law enforcement officer predicted a .14 to .33 percent increase in the number of reported behavioral incidents in the district. Though this is less than a percentage point, this translates to




Figure 14. Number of physical restraints in state of FL from 2014-15 to 2018-19 school years by level

approximately 1.5 to 3.6 more reported incidents for the average size district for each additional school with an officer present. Furthermore, it suggests that, if the average size district in the state had no schools with officers as compared to all schools with officers, there would be approximately 85 to 200 fewer behavioral incidents reported per year in that district.

At the school-level, results were generally similar, though the positive relationship between law enforcement and reported behavioral incidents became insignificant when school fixed effects were included. As shown in columns 1-2 of Panel B of Table 13, the presence of an officer predicted a 38.5% greater number of reported incidents in models with district fixed effects. In models with school fixed effects, however, the IRR was reduced to 1.024 and was statistically insignificant. This could be a function of the school fixed effect better accounting for underlying characteristics of the schools, or, it may also reflect the fact that the school fixed effects models were driven largely by variation at the elementary school level, given that there were far more elementary schools that went from not having an officer to having an officer than was the case for middle or high schools. Indeed, as shown in Figure 15, the relationship between law enforcement and reported behavioral incidents was largest in middle and high schools, suggesting that the lack of significance in the school fixed effects model may be a function of much of the within-school variation coming from elementary settings.

The increase in reported behavioral incidents as a result of law enforcement in schools appeared to be driven primarily by Level 2 offenses (see columns 3-10 of Table 13). As shown, the relationship between law enforcement and reported behavioral incidents was statistically significant and positive in both the district-level analysis and school-level analysis and across models with varying fixed effects for Level 2 offenses. In contrast, offenses at other levels were not consistently statistically significant, particularly in the fully specified models. The results are clear that the presence of law enforcement in schools was not systematically related to decreases in behavioral incidents and may result in more reports of such incidents, suggesting that schools were not made safer by the presence of law enforcement.




Figure 15. IRRs and 95% confidence intervals predicting behavioral incidents by level from the school-level analysis

### Law Enforcement Presence and Reports to Law Enforcement

In addition to potentially increasing the number of reported behavioral incidents in schools, the presence of law enforcement positively predicted the number of behavioral incidents that were reported to law enforcement by schools. At the district-level, each additional school with an officer present positively predicted a statistically significant increase in the number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement (see columns 1-2 of Panel A of Table 14). The coefficients ranged from 0.0011 in the model with district fixed effects to 0.00312 in the model without district fixed effects, which, relative to the average number of incidents



reported, translates to an approximately 0.41 to 1.17 additional incidents reported to law enforcement by a district per year for each additional officer. This suggests that if the average size district in the state had no schools with officers as compared to all schools with officers, there would be between 6-17% fewer incidents reported to law enforcement or between 23 to 65 fewer incidents reported annually by such a district.

Similarly, at the school-level, the presence of a law enforcement officer in a school was a significant predictor of reports of behavioral incidents to law enforcement. As shown in columns 1-2 of Panel B of Table 14, having an officer in a school was related to a higher number of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement, both in models with district fixed effects and school fixed effects. This positive relationship ranged from a 25.7% increase in incidents in the school fixed effect model to a 64.8% increase in the district fixed effects model which, based on the average number of incidents reported by a school, would equate to 2.12 to 5.35 additional incidents reported to law enforcement per year per school. While this positive relationship was generally significant across grade levels, the relationship was particularly pronounced at the middle school level (see Figure 16). This is consistent with prior research that has found that school disciplinary rates and effects of SROs can be more pronounced for middle schoolers.

Across both district and school-level analyses, the results suggest that the effects of law enforcement in schools on reports of behavioral incidents to law enforcement may be most pronounced among lower level offenses. As shown in columns 3-10 of Table 14 and in Figure 17, the relationship between law enforcement in schools and number of incidents reported to law enforcement tended to be highest for Level 4 offenses (the least serious) and lowest for Level 1 offenses (the most serious offenses). This suggests that the presence of law enforcement may be resulting in more frequent reporting of offenses that may otherwise have been handled by school staff without involving law enforcement.




Figure 16. IRRs and 95% confidence intervals predicting behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement by school-level from the school-level analysis




Figure 17. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals predicting behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement by severity level from the district-level analysis

## Law Enforcement Presence and School Arrests

Given that law enforcement presence in schools appeared to result in more behavioral incidents being reported to law enforcement, it was also important to examine whether more students were arrested at school as a result. As shown in Table 15, results of models predicting the number of arrests of juveniles at public schools demonstrate that the presence of law enforcement in schools likely increased arrests of students. In the district-level analysis (Panel A of Table 15), the relationship between law enforcement presence and school arrests was consistently positive, though often statistically insignificant. The lack of consistent significance in the district-level models, however, may have been a function of the relatively smaller sample size and lack of ability to link arrests occurring in particular schools with the placement of law enforcement in those schools. Results from the school-level analysis (Panel B of Table 15) show that, with the additional precision afforded in the school-level dataset, these positive relationships held and were statistically significant, both in district and school fixed effects models. As shown, the presence of law enforcement in schools predicted 40 to 82% more arrests, on average. Relative to the average number of arrests (2.55), this suggests that the presence of a law enforcement officer in a school resulted in approximately 1-2 more arrests per school per year. Across the average sized district, the difference in arrests if the district had no law enforcement relative to having law enforcement in all schools would therefore equate to about 55 to 110 fewer arrests per year.

Interestingly, while a positive relationship with arrests was seen across racial/ethnic groups, the impact was most consistent for white students, rather than Black or Hispanic students. As shown, in the district-level analysis, only the coefficient on white students reached statistical significance at the  $p < .05$  level. Similarly, at the school-level, the impact on arrests was statistically significant for white students in both the district fixed effects and school fixed effects models, while, for Black and Hispanic students, the result, though still positive in direction, was statistically insignificant when the school fixed effects were included. Importantly, statistical tests of the difference in the coefficients for white student arrests were no different than those for Black or Hispanic students, suggesting that the impact of law enforcement is not necessarily larger for white students, despite being more consistently statistically significant. While prior research would have suggested larger impacts on racial/ethnic minority students, this finding was consistent with descriptive trends in the state which show increases in school-based arrests of white students between 2017-18 and 2018-19 without a similar increase for Black students. It is also important to note that the rate of school arrests remains higher for Black and Hispanic students, indicating that despite school-based law enforcement increasing arrests of white students, Black and Hispanic students remain




Figure 18. IRRs and 95% confidence intervals predicting school arrests by grade level from the school-level analysis

disproportionately likely to experience an arrest at school relative to their white peers.

The relationship between law enforcement presence and school arrests was generally consistent across grade levels. As shown in Figure 18, the IRR was similar across elementary, middle, and high schools, suggesting that the presence of a law enforcement officer increases the probability of arrest fairly equally across grade levels. Importantly, however, each of these increases was relative to different base line rates of arrest. Given that elementary schools had far fewer school arrests than middle or high schools, the increase in the number of arrests as a result of school-based law enforcement was still more pronounced at higher grade levels.

Finally, an exploratory analysis was conducted examining the relationship between law enforcement presence and school arrests by offense type. Versions of the primary equation were estimated using arrests by offense type as the outcome. In the district-level analysis with district fixed effects, there were positive and at least marginally ( $p < 0.10$ ) significant relationships with assault/battery, burglary, disorderly conduct, and petit/larceny. At the school-level with district fixed effects, a number of offense types were statistically significant (significant ones are shown in Figure 19). When the school fixed effects were added to the school-level analysis, assault/battery and weapons arrests remained positive and statistically significant while felony drug arrests was marginally significant.

### Law Enforcement Presence and Exclusionary Discipline

While law enforcement in schools would be expected to increase the likelihood of reports to law enforcement and arrests, prior research also suggests that their presence may contribute to a greater use of exclusionary discipline practices like suspension. Table 16 presents results of models predicting the use of OSS and ISS from indicators of law enforcement in schools as well as OSS broken out by race. As shown, there were few significant relationships in the district-level analysis and, while estimates were positive and significant in the school-level analysis with district fixed effects, these relationships were not robust to the inclusion of the school fixed effects. As a whole, then, these




Figure 19. IRRs and 95% confidence intervals predicting school arrests by offense type from the school-level analysis

results suggest that, in the Florida context, the presence of law enforcement in schools were not necessarily resulting in increases in the use of exclusionary discipline.

### Sensitivity and Robustness Checks

As discussed previously, for the district-level analysis, the primary analytic approach was to model the logged version of outcomes using an ordinary least squares regression framework with weights for district enrollment to account for differing sizes of districts. This approach was used to account for the skewed distribution of the outcome variables and was suitable given that few districts reported values of zero for the outcome (which would result in an unidentified value when log transformed and therefore drop from the analysis). In contrast, at the school-level, there were many schools that reported no incidents. Consequently, the primary school-level analyses were reported using conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression, an approach suitable for count outcome data that retains observations with values of zero.

In addition to these primary analytic approaches, a series of sensitivity checks were conducted to explore the robustness of the findings to alternative estimation approaches. In particular, versions of the primary equations were estimated that used ordinary least squares regression, used untransformed outcome variables, included or omitted weighting for enrollment, and used Poisson regression (another method appropriate for estimating count outcomes). Additionally, models were estimated that used the number of law enforcement in a district or in a school as the independent variable rather than the number of schools served or the binary indicator of whether a school had law enforcement. The results of these sensitivity analyses are presented in tables in Appendix B. Across these tables, the primary model is shown in the top row and other specifications are shown below. For ease of comparison, statistically significant positive relationships are highlighted in blue and statistically significant negative relationships are highlighted in orange. Statistically insignificant findings have a white background. While the coefficients were expected to be different in size across some models given the different estimation strategies, the sensitivity checks generally show that the primary results are robust to a number of specification choices.

### Limitations

While this report provides the most comprehensive analysis of law enforcement in Florida schools to date, it is important to note several limitations. First, results of this study are limited to reports of law enforcement and outcomes by school districts. As noted earlier, there is some indication that school districts may report school safety assistants and other personnel as law enforcement to the state. While these individuals are not technically sworn law enforcement and generally lack arrest power, they are trained by a Sheriff's department, typically wear uniforms, and are armed. Consequently, it is likely that many students perceive and experience them in ways similar to sworn law enforcement.

Next, this analysis was unable to identify alternative forms of security in schools such as armed school staff, unarmed security guards, or other private security. Given the 2018 Act, any school without law enforcement in 2018-19 was required to have either an armed staff member or other armed security personnel. Consequently, the results of this analysis should be interpreted as comparing the use of law enforcement in schools to a mix of other alternatives that, depending on the year, may include no security personnel, unarmed security personnel, or armed non-law enforcement personnel. It is expected, however, that the impact of such comparisons to other security personnel would diminish relationships estimated in this analysis,

meaning that the true impacts of law enforcement on student outcomes may be larger than those reported here.

Finally, it is worth noting that this study cannot definitively eliminate all sources of selection bias. While the research design accounts for a large number of potential confounding variables, it is nevertheless possible that districts/schools with and without law enforcement varied in unobservable ways that contributed to the observed relationships. That said, the analytic approach used here accounted for a robust set of differences in schools including observable characteristics of the students served, general time trends in the state as a whole, and time-invariant characteristics of the district/schools such as general crime or safety of areas that schools serve. As a result, this analysis provides a very rigorous estimate of law enforcement's relationship with student outcomes.

## Conclusion

In the months following the killing of George Floyd by law enforcement, school districts and local governments across the country have reconsidered the role of law enforcement in their schools, with several large districts choosing to remove law enforcement. These discussions and actions are in distinct contrast to what had previously been a decades long trend toward increasing the number of schools across the nation that have law enforcement present (Correa & Diliberti, 2020; Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). This research report contributes to these ongoing policy discussions over whether law enforcement should be placed in schools.

The findings of this report suggest that, in Florida, the presence of law enforcement in schools is linked to a number of undesirable outcomes for students and schools. Despite being placed in schools largely to improve safety, the results of this analysis suggest that school-based law enforcement have not reduced the frequency of behavioral incidents occurring in schools. In fact, their presence appears to result in more behavioral incidents being reported to the state tracking system.

What is more, the results of this analysis suggest that law enforcement in schools results in greater exposure of students to law enforcement responses. The results consistently showed that, when law enforcement are in schools, a greater number of behavioral incidents are reported to law enforcement. Alarming, there is evidence that law enforcement in schools increases the frequency of lower level incidents being reported to law enforcement.

The results also suggests that this increased reporting of incidents to law enforcement leads to more students experiencing arrest at school. Results of the school-level analysis consistently showed that the presence of law enforcement in schools was related to a greater number of juvenile arrests in public schools. While district-level results were statistically insignificant, they nevertheless followed the same trend. In contrast to what might be suggested by prior research, the potential impact on school arrests appeared to be most consistent for white students, though Black students continue to be disproportionately over-represented among school arrests overall.

Finally, this report found little evidence that the presence of law enforcement in schools decreased the frequency with which schools reported using exclusionary discipline practices like OSS and ISS. This finding is consistent with there being little impact of school-based law

enforcement on student safety, as it suggests that the frequency of incidents resulting in a serious disciplinary response was not decreased.

The findings of this analysis fit within a mixed set of prior evidence on the impacts of school-based law enforcement on school safety and rather consistent prior evidence that law enforcement increases students' exposure to arrest and exclusionary discipline. Some prior work has found that the presence of law enforcement in schools decreases school crime. For example, using national data, Owens found that principals reported 1-2% fewer disruptive criminal incidents at school when the county they were located in had received a federal grant to support the hiring of school-based law enforcement (2016). Similarly, prior studies have found that the presence of law enforcement in schools is related to higher perceptions of safety among students (Raymond, 2010). That said, other prior work has found that law enforcement do not increase school safety. In a national study of schools, Na & Gottfredson found that schools with law enforcement report more crimes involving weapons and drugs than those without (2013). Other emerging work suggests that, law enforcement in schools may increase students' sense of risk, heightening their perceived need of law enforcement to protect them from objectively unlikely to occur threats (Curran, Fisher, Viano, & Kupchik, 2020).

Even for the most serious of incidents, such as mass shootings, the prior evidence suggests the presence of law enforcement does little to prevent or limit the damage done during such an event. For example, a study of all school shootings that have occurred since the Columbine tragedy found that the presence of law enforcement at a school did not predict lower casualties (Livingston, Rossheim, & Hall, 2019). It is worth noting that many of the mass casualty school shootings, including those at Parkland and Columbine, occurred with law enforcement present on campus.

While prior work is somewhat mixed on the impact of school-based law enforcement on safety, prior work is clear that law enforcement in schools increases students' likelihood of interfacing with and experiencing a law enforcement response like arrest. Prior work has shown that law enforcement in schools result in a greater proportion of incidents being reported to law enforcement and in increases in arrests of students (Owens, 2016). This results in what many have termed the "school-to-prison" pipeline.

The findings of this study demonstrate a potentially similar phenomenon in which students are exposed to a higher level of surveillance by law enforcement. By placing law enforcement in schools, student behavior that would have otherwise occurred and been handled by school personnel is more likely to come to the attention of law enforcement. It is likely then that the increases in behavioral incidents reported to the state and those reported to law enforcement observed in this study are a product not of increased misconduct by students but of increased involvement of law enforcement in the response to such misconduct. Such law enforcement involvement, as seen in this study, potentially increases students' risk of arrest at school and involvement in the juvenile justice system.

Finally, while law enforcement presence in schools was not systematically related to increases in exclusionary discipline, it also did not appear to decrease school's use of exclusionary discipline. Prior research has often found law enforcement presence increases exclusionary discipline (Fisher & Hennessy, 2016; Kupchik, 2010). For example, prior studies have found that schools in Texas that received federal grants to support additional law enforcement in schools resulted in greater rates of school discipline, as much as a 6% increase



among middle schoolers, and that these impacts were driven by increases in discipline for lower level offenses and among Black students (Weisburst, 2019). Qualitative work has shown that these increases may be driven by the ways that law enforcement take part in disciplinary activities such as reporting misconduct to school personnel and assisting with interrogations of misbehaving students as well as the ways that school-based law enforcement may contribute to shifts in school climate more broadly that result in a more punitive environment (Curran, Fisher, Viano, & Kupchik, 2019; Kupchik, 2010). Though there are some exceptions to the finding that law enforcement in schools increase exclusionary discipline, including one that uses a similar approach to this analysis with longitudinal school-level data (Na & Gottfredson, 2013), a meta-analytic review has confirmed that, on balance, most studies show that school-based law enforcement are related to higher rates of exclusionary discipline (Fisher & Hennessy, 2016).

Coupled with such prior research, the findings of this study suggest that schools should carefully consider their use of law enforcement in schools, both whether law enforcement should be present in schools at all and, if they are, the roles and interactions that law enforcement engage in with students. While many districts nationwide are considering removing law enforcement from schools, the decision in Florida is complicated by the restrictions of the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act which requires schools to have armed personnel. While schools in other states can decide to not have law enforcement or any armed personnel present, Florida schools that opt not to use school-based law enforcement are then required to either arm school personnel (such as teachers) or hire private armed security. Unfortunately, neither of these alternative solutions are evidence-based and each raises its own set of concerns around student safety and well-being. Consequently, there is a need for the state law to be revisited to return flexibility to local districts to determine whether law enforcement or armed personnel should be in schools. In the meantime, if schools determine that the use of law enforcement is preferable to the alternatives, they should actively take steps to reduce the potentially negative impacts of school-based law enforcement on student outcomes. To this end, the following policy recommendations are offered:

1. School districts should reconsider whether law enforcement should be present in schools, keeping in mind that state law limits alternatives.
2. The state requirement to have armed personnel in schools should be revisited with an eye toward returning control to local school districts and schools to determine how best to ensure a safe learning environment.
3. School districts and law enforcement agencies should adopt clear policies that restrict the ability to arrest to a limited set of serious infractions and prohibit arrest of young students.
4. If present, law enforcement in schools should be trained in age-appropriate conflict resolution, in ways to reduce implicit bias and disproportionate minority contact, and in alternatives to the use of force or arrest.

At the end of the day, all students deserve a safe, supportive, and equitable learning environment. The results of this analysis suggest that the use of law enforcement in schools may be compromising student well-being without increasing the safety of schools. It is important, therefore, for policymakers and educators to actively seek solutions to ensure students are safe from unnecessary exposure to law enforcement and arrest.

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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of control variables for district-level analysis

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Enrollment	41717.48 (66855.14)	40937.70 (66316.45)	41446.76 (67034.07)	41824.54 (67537.91)	42076.46 (67683.83)	42301.94 (67704.10)
Proportion White Enrollment	0.55 (0.20)	0.57 (0.20)	0.56 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)	0.55 (0.20)	0.54 (0.20)
Proportion Black Enrollment	0.18 (0.14)	0.19 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)
Proportion Hispanic/Latinx Enrollment	0.20 (0.17)	0.19 (0.16)	0.20 (0.16)	0.20 (0.17)	0.21 (0.17)	0.21 (0.17)
Proportion Asian Enrollment	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Proportion Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander Enrollment	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Proportion American Indian or Alaska Native Enrollment	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Proportion Two or More Races Enrollment	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Proportion of Students Receiving Free/Reduced Lunch	0.68 (0.17)	0.59 (0.12)	0.69 (0.16)	0.70 (0.17)	0.70 (0.19)	0.69 (0.20)
# Schools	55.34 (85.47)	55.15 (85.56)	55.37 (85.85)	55.40 (86.01)	55.37 (86.20)	55.42 (86.30)
# Elementary Schools	28.33 (42.18)	28.34 (42.49)	28.42 (42.73)	28.39 (42.59)	28.21 (42.19)	28.27 (42.17)
# Middle Schools	8.75 (13.47)	8.91 (13.76)	8.82 (13.60)	8.69 (13.41)	8.67 (13.50)	8.64 (13.48)
# High Schools	10.60 (16.59)	10.63 (16.66)	10.66 (16.60)	10.67 (16.81)	10.58 (16.75)	10.48 (16.60)
Teachers per 1,000 Students	63.37 (6.38)	63.32 (5.85)	63.59 (6.41)	63.39 (6.80)	63.09 (5.54)	63.46 (7.32)
Guidance Counselors per 1,000 Students	2.15 (0.47)	2.16 (0.52)	2.16 (0.49)	2.13 (0.44)	2.12 (0.48)	2.17 (0.45)
Psychologists per 1,000 Students	0.36 (0.25)	0.38 (0.26)	0.36 (0.23)	0.34 (0.27)	0.36 (0.24)	0.36 (0.23)
Principals per 1,000 Students	1.48 (0.51)	1.51 (0.42)	1.54 (0.55)	1.49 (0.55)	1.42 (0.48)	1.45 (0.52)
Asst. Principals per 1,000 Students	1.70 (0.51)	1.64 (0.50)	1.67 (0.47)	1.68 (0.50)	1.71 (0.52)	1.78 (0.54)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Note. Data from FL DOE public data archive

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of control variables for school-level analysis

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Enrollment	854.84 (539.52)	846.82 (526.77)	859.49 (541.72)	867.00 (549.29)	860.79 (543.97)	841.49 (535.46)
Proportion White Enrollment	0.45 (0.25)	0.47 (0.25)	0.46 (0.25)	0.45 (0.25)	0.45 (0.25)	0.44 (0.25)
Proportion Black Enrollment	0.20 (0.21)	0.21 (0.20)	0.19 (0.21)	0.19 (0.21)	0.19 (0.20)	0.20 (0.22)
Proportion Hispanic/Latinx Enrollment	0.25 (0.20)	0.25 (0.19)	0.25 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)
Proportion Asian Enrollment	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Proportion Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander Enrollment	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Proportion American Indian or Alaska Native Enrollment	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Proportion Two or More Races Enrollment	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Proportion of Students Receiving Free/Reduced Lunch	0.65 (0.27)	0.59 (0.24)	0.66 (0.27)	0.66 (0.27)	0.67 (0.27)	0.66 (0.28)
Elementary	0.57 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.57 (0.50)	0.59 (0.49)
Middle	0.18 (0.39)	0.19 (0.39)	0.19 (0.39)	0.19 (0.39)	0.18 (0.39)	0.17 (0.38)
High	0.16 (0.36)	0.16 (0.37)	0.16 (0.36)	0.16 (0.36)	0.16 (0.36)	0.15 (0.35)
Observations	9,972	1,840	1,922	1,924	2,064	2,222

Note.

Table 3. Means and standard deviations of law enforcement presence in school districts from district-level analysis

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
# of Schools Served by Officers	38.03 (54.57)	37.60 (58.55)	36.30 (46.73)	33.51 (46.20)	34.46 (48.85)	48.28 (69.25)
# of Schools Served by Officers - Elementary	18.87 (31.19)	17.37 (29.20)	18.03 (28.49)	16.00 (28.50)	16.78 (29.90)	26.18 (38.50)
# of Schools Served by Officers - Middle	7.84 (11.34)	7.78 (11.72)	7.84 (11.44)	7.85 (11.49)	7.79 (11.04)	7.96 (11.34)
# of Schools Served by Officers - High	6.27 (8.39)	5.93 (7.95)	6.16 (7.93)	6.09 (7.96)	6.34 (8.37)	6.85 (9.79)
# of Officers	29.75 (45.36)	21.35 (30.73)	22.63 (31.94)	22.93 (31.36)	27.53 (35.87)	54.31 (73.41)
# of Officers - Elementary	9.94 (22.21)	4.07 (10.07)	4.58 (10.57)	5.26 (11.68)	8.49 (14.85)	27.31 (39.14)
# of Officers - Middle	7.70 (11.51)	7.12 (11.61)	7.56 (11.84)	7.43 (11.39)	7.65 (11.12)	8.75 (11.87)
# of Officers - High	7.83 (10.66)	6.97 (9.69)	7.16 (9.97)	7.15 (9.97)	7.91 (10.57)	9.96 (12.81)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Note. Data from district self-reports to annual FL DOE Safe Schools Appropriations Expenditure Report



Table 4. Means and standard deviations of law enforcement presence in school districts from school-level analysis

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Law Enforcement Present	0.62 (0.48)	0.57 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	0.61 (0.49)	0.61 (0.49)	0.72 (0.45)
Law Enforcement Present - Elementary	0.45 (0.50)	0.38 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)	0.41 (0.49)	0.42 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)
Law Enforcement Present - Middle	0.91 (0.28)	0.89 (0.31)	0.90 (0.30)	0.91 (0.29)	0.91 (0.29)	0.95 (0.22)
Law Enforcement Present - High	0.95 (0.22)	0.93 (0.26)	0.94 (0.24)	0.95 (0.22)	0.95 (0.22)	0.97 (0.18)
# of Law Enforcement	0.56 (0.52)	0.48 (0.51)	0.52 (0.52)	0.52 (0.51)	0.52 (0.51)	0.75 (0.50)
# of Law Enforcement - Elementary	0.31 (0.41)	0.19 (0.32)	0.22 (0.34)	0.23 (0.34)	0.23 (0.34)	0.60 (0.49)
# of Law Enforcement - Middle	0.90 (0.30)	0.86 (0.32)	0.91 (0.33)	0.89 (0.30)	0.89 (0.30)	0.95 (0.25)
# of Law Enforcement - High	1.09 (0.45)	1.05 (0.46)	1.07 (0.45)	1.09 (0.46)	1.08 (0.43)	1.17 (0.44)
Observations	9972	1840	1922	1924	2064	2222

Note. Data gathered from school district and law enforcement agencies

Table 5. Means and standard deviations for district-level reports of behavioral incidents

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Incidents						
Total	1099.66 (2001.84)	1080.27 (2065.42)	1073.49 (2097.44)	1019.06 (1995.35)	1062.07 (1870.79)	1263.42 (2024.06)
Level 1	38.60 (72.38)	43.03 (81.80)	39.45 (70.16)	35.49 (66.64)	36.52 (72.59)	38.52 (71.79)
Level 2	178.04 (704.63)	163.34 (751.52)	196.31 (805.50)	198.45 (813.80)	171.69 (633.89)	160.43 (483.26)
Level 3	669.69 (1201.02)	696.54 (1295.93)	677.18 (1253.18)	632.25 (1152.36)	643.33 (1119.96)	699.13 (1209.85)
Level 4	213.33 (353.80)	177.36 (264.73)	160.55 (235.48)	152.87 (246.14)	210.54 (338.35)	365.33 (549.13)
Alcohol	18.01 (22.27)	18.03 (22.70)	17.73 (22.43)	17.21 (21.29)	18.48 (22.51)	18.60 (23.01)
Arson	1.31 (2.83)	1.55 (2.95)	1.49 (3.05)	1.19 (2.96)	1.24 (3.05)	1.09 (2.08)
Battery - Aggravated/Felony	36.67 (70.13)	40.87 (79.27)	37.51 (67.86)	33.70 (64.24)	34.63 (69.99)	36.67 (70.30)
Breaking and Entering/Burglary	4.18 (25.14)	5.18 (29.05)	4.28 (25.00)	6.12 (37.08)	3.18 (16.00)	2.15 (9.40)
Bullying	45.53 (83.00)	43.84 (75.78)	42.52 (73.26)	46.87 (94.41)	43.91 (78.84)	50.49 (92.64)
Disruption on Campus-Major	49.67 (111.17)	48.01 (116.14)	50.61 (119.30)	49.52 (113.06)	50.09 (111.39)	50.10 (98.12)
Drug Sale/Distribution Excluding Alcohol	8.95 (12.66)	9.93 (13.34)	8.24 (11.56)	7.45 (10.68)	8.36 (11.73)	10.79 (15.49)
Drug Use/Possession Excluding Alcohol	103.57 (152.34)	97.30 (148.97)	93.90 (139.46)	90.69 (132.23)	101.60 (147.89)	134.36 (187.57)
Fighting	312.33 (740.55)	359.07 (878.08)	327.46 (798.43)	294.34 (719.91)	288.96 (668.95)	291.79 (630.27)
Harassment	26.89 (50.33)	26.93 (48.96)	27.19 (51.43)	26.46 (51.21)	24.69 (46.25)	29.19 (54.83)
Hazing	0.10 (0.42)	0.09 (0.45)	0.09 (0.38)	0.09 (0.54)	0.16 (0.41)	0.06 (0.30)
Homicide	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)
Kidnapping	0.02 (0.13)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.21)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.00)
Larceny/Theft	25.87 (61.47)	31.06 (73.02)	30.48 (64.40)	29.19 (77.18)	21.06 (42.30)	17.55 (41.75)
Other Major	36.65 (86.40)	33.27 (76.88)	40.22 (92.96)	37.54 (98.02)	36.49 (89.00)	35.75 (75.30)

Physical Attack	138.81	118.75	154.34	158.67	137.31	124.96
	(687.36)	(737.43)	(790.06)	(797.51)	(615.48)	(454.85)
Robbery	2.12	2.06	2.48	2.19	1.93	1.94
	(5.57)	(5.73)	(6.51)	(5.43)	(4.83)	(5.35)
Sexual Assault	0.65	0.34	0.37	0.69	0.81	1.03
	(1.75)	(1.21)	(1.11)	(1.76)	(1.97)	(2.34)
Sexual Battery	0.59	0.61	0.42	0.55	0.63	0.75
	(1.53)	(1.60)	(1.16)	(1.41)	(1.48)	(1.93)
Sexual Harassment	30.37	26.43	26.82	29.03	32.18	37.40
	(74.49)	(58.04)	(59.55)	(69.08)	(74.20)	(103.95)
Sexual Offenses (Other)	22.40	21.19	23.48	21.33	22.24	23.78
	(44.07)	(53.35)	(46.78)	(39.21)	(35.91)	(44.26)
Threat/Intimidation	69.93	62.75	64.30	61.42	73.21	87.96
	(123.98)	(109.44)	(114.49)	(109.41)	(127.03)	(155.21)
Tobacco-Nicotine	122.90	88.57	73.10	62.33	123.46	267.04
	(243.16)	(150.17)	(121.04)	(116.10)	(219.50)	(414.52)
Trespassing	7.54	7.72	8.15	7.09	6.78	7.99
	(18.05)	(15.58)	(22.52)	(16.86)	(15.39)	(19.39)
Vandalism	11.26	9.64	11.67	12.01	10.57	12.40
	(36.31)	(32.37)	(38.71)	(39.88)	(33.29)	(37.71)
Weapons Possession	23.34	27.09	26.60	23.33	20.10	19.57
	(49.20)	(63.29)	(59.64)	(45.63)	(38.39)	(32.91)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Table 6. Means and standard deviations for school-level reports of behavioral incidents

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Incidents						
Total	21.02 (34.39)	17.68 (28.78)	20.44 (33.81)	19.55 (31.88)	21.21 (34.28)	25.41 (40.41)
Level 1	0.83 (3.06)	0.86 (2.47)	0.87 (2.94)	0.80 (2.85)	0.81 (3.46)	0.79 (3.36)
Level 2	2.61 (7.29)	1.48 (3.44)	2.48 (6.93)	2.66 (7.87)	2.70 (7.19)	3.53 (9.16)
Level 3	13.06 (23.60)	11.76 (20.99)	13.58 (24.96)	12.85 (23.11)	13.25 (23.79)	13.68 (24.63)
Level 4	4.53 (10.25)	3.57 (6.88)	3.51 (6.63)	3.23 (6.24)	4.44 (9.22)	7.40 (16.44)
Alcohol	0.43 (1.29)	0.41 (1.29)	0.46 (1.42)	0.42 (1.23)	0.47 (1.29)	0.42 (1.21)
Arson	0.03 (0.20)	0.04 (0.21)	0.03 (0.19)	0.02 (0.23)	0.03 (0.21)	0.03 (0.18)
Battery - Aggravated/Felony	0.78 (2.98)	0.81 (2.42)	0.84 (2.87)	0.77 (2.73)	0.77 (3.41)	0.75 (3.28)
Breaking and Entering/Burglary	0.03 (0.23)	0.03 (0.22)	0.02 (0.17)	0.04 (0.23)	0.03 (0.25)	0.02 (0.24)
Bullying	0.97 (2.37)	0.87 (1.93)	0.91 (2.05)	1.01 (3.08)	0.96 (2.18)	1.08 (2.43)
Disruption on Campus-Major	1.05 (4.15)	0.92 (3.78)	1.13 (5.31)	1.07 (4.25)	1.11 (3.86)	1.01 (3.41)
Drug Sale/Distribution Excluding Alcohol	0.21 (0.70)	0.23 (0.74)	0.20 (0.66)	0.18 (0.60)	0.21 (0.70)	0.25 (0.79)
Drug Use/Possession Excluding Alcohol	2.25 (5.65)	2.08 (5.05)	2.05 (5.01)	2.04 (5.03)	2.26 (5.59)	2.72 (7.01)
Fighting	5.33 (12.89)	4.73 (10.97)	5.89 (14.12)	5.19 (11.75)	5.24 (12.99)	5.55 (14.04)
Harassment	0.58 (1.78)	0.54 (1.75)	0.60 (1.83)	0.61 (1.88)	0.52 (1.50)	0.61 (1.90)
Hazing	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.10)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)
Homicide	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Kidnapping	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Larceny/Theft	0.45 (1.33)	0.51 (1.44)	0.59 (1.62)	0.50 (1.45)	0.41 (1.21)	0.29 (0.87)
Other Major	0.78 (3.43)	0.69 (3.84)	0.80 (3.74)	0.89 (4.20)	0.85 (3.18)	0.65 (1.95)
Physical Attack	1.82 (6.89)	0.61 (2.67)	1.67 (6.52)	1.89 (7.47)	1.95 (6.72)	2.79 (8.83)
Robbery	0.04 (0.29)	0.04 (0.26)	0.04 (0.34)	0.04 (0.29)	0.03 (0.29)	0.03 (0.25)
Sexual Assault	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02

	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Sexual Battery	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Sexual Harassment	0.72	0.60	0.65	0.73	0.76	0.83
	(2.01)	(1.81)	(1.82)	(2.01)	(2.03)	(2.28)
Sexual Offenses (Other)	0.48	0.43	0.52	0.48	0.52	0.46
	(1.32)	(1.22)	(1.45)	(1.32)	(1.34)	(1.26)
Threat/Intimidation	1.67	1.50	1.60	1.61	1.79	1.83
	(4.17)	(3.84)	(4.41)	(4.72)	(4.00)	(3.87)
Tobacco-Nicotine	2.55	1.75	1.54	1.19	2.49	5.30
	(8.67)	(4.96)	(4.57)	(3.66)	(7.59)	(14.93)
Trespassing	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.10
	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.57)
Vandalism	0.22	0.17	0.23	0.24	0.20	0.25
	(0.99)	(0.69)	(1.03)	(1.10)	(0.93)	(1.09)
Weapons Possession	0.50	0.58	0.54	0.51	0.46	0.42
	(1.15)	(1.27)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.12)	(1.01)
Observations	9,972	1,840	1,922	1,924	2,064	2,222



Table 7. Means and standard deviations for district-level reports of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Reported to Law Enforcement						
Total	377.76 (577.77)	375.72 (626.87)	377.28 (594.27)	349.54 (547.98)	349.31 (541.59)	436.94 (586.85)
Level 1	38.25 (72.09)	42.61 (81.57)	39.12 (70.11)	35.24 (66.30)	36.10 (71.97)	38.16 (71.58)
Level 2	53.45 (103.65)	56.00 (125.48)	57.37 (116.27)	54.21 (106.64)	45.48 (70.52)	54.19 (93.11)
Level 3	244.52 (386.91)	240.00 (406.69)	246.40 (396.90)	231.57 (371.93)	228.30 (370.95)	276.33 (396.51)
Level 4	41.54 (73.57)	37.10 (72.40)	34.39 (59.88)	28.52 (48.28)	39.43 (71.96)	68.25 (100.41)
Alcohol	9.09 (14.74)	9.93 (15.60)	9.60 (16.19)	9.49 (16.26)	8.69 (13.38)	7.76 (12.13)
Arson	0.96 (2.33)	1.13 (2.35)	1.16 (2.76)	0.94 (2.65)	0.82 (2.02)	0.73 (1.73)
Battery - Aggravated/Felony	36.67 (70.13)	40.87 (79.27)	37.51 (67.86)	33.70 (64.24)	34.63 (69.99)	36.67 (70.30)
Breaking and Entering/Burglary	4.05 (25.14)	5.01 (29.06)	4.13 (25.01)	6.01 (37.09)	3.10 (16.01)	1.99 (9.25)
Bullying	4.92 (11.31)	5.22 (13.90)	5.28 (13.17)	4.37 (9.88)	5.06 (10.83)	4.67 (8.09)
Disruption on Campus-Major	41.67 (105.17)	41.24 (114.94)	44.03 (114.71)	43.52 (109.30)	38.76 (102.11)	40.82 (84.93)
Drug Sale/Distribution Excluding Alcohol	8.19 (11.88)	9.07 (12.92)	7.69 (10.82)	6.90 (10.11)	7.61 (10.81)	9.70 (14.34)
Drug Use/Possession Excluding Alcohol	91.46 (135.59)	86.27 (137.84)	85.27 (126.74)	79.93 (111.91)	85.64 (127.47)	120.19 (167.73)
Fighting	26.91 (53.98)	28.43 (55.47)	29.39 (56.73)	23.39 (50.29)	26.97 (64.54)	26.37 (41.64)
Harassment	2.78 (5.48)	2.66 (5.58)	2.96 (6.20)	2.76 (5.66)	2.42 (5.06)	3.12 (4.94)
Hazing	0.02 (0.19)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.04 (0.37)	0.01 (0.12)	0.03 (0.17)
Homicide	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)
Kidnapping	0.02 (0.13)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.21)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.00)
Larceny/Theft	17.27 (57.37)	21.82 (68.06)	20.78 (59.24)	20.97 (74.24)	12.16 (37.15)	10.63 (38.75)
Other Major	13.07 (30.65)	12.96 (35.49)	14.21 (34.74)	13.72 (34.57)	11.48 (22.92)	13.01 (23.72)
Physical Attack	15.66	12.73	16.46	15.66	12.70	20.75

	(54.14)	(67.48)	(59.69)	(53.23)	(27.70)	(55.43)
Robbery	1.93	1.91	2.34	2.09	1.61	1.67
	(5.27)	(5.59)	(6.20)	(5.22)	(4.35)	(4.91)
Sexual Assault	0.28	0.18	0.15	0.22	0.34	0.52
	(0.74)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.81)	(1.09)
Sexual Battery	0.59	0.61	0.42	0.55	0.63	0.75
	(1.53)	(1.60)	(1.16)	(1.41)	(1.48)	(1.93)
Sexual Harassment	6.80	5.90	5.69	6.61	7.18	8.63
	(16.79)	(15.57)	(12.30)	(17.86)	(17.35)	(20.18)
Sexual Offenses (Other)	10.56	9.88	11.76	10.30	10.31	10.57
	(20.23)	(22.62)	(22.92)	(19.01)	(18.44)	(18.19)
Threat/Intimidation	28.34	24.30	25.91	23.90	29.04	38.54
	(58.24)	(58.32)	(59.72)	(49.02)	(53.90)	(68.87)
Tobacco-Nicotine	24.74	19.30	16.55	11.90	23.27	52.70
	(52.78)	(46.13)	(31.49)	(24.31)	(48.51)	(83.51)
Trespassing	3.45	3.93	3.60	3.24	2.73	3.75
	(9.55)	(9.98)	(9.27)	(8.91)	(6.31)	(12.48)
Vandalism	4.96	5.28	5.78	5.96	4.00	3.79
	(24.83)	(28.87)	(29.28)	(28.86)	(18.17)	(16.17)
Weapons Possession	23.34	27.09	26.60	23.33	20.10	19.57
	(49.20)	(63.29)	(59.64)	(45.63)	(38.39)	(32.91)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Table 8. Means and standard deviations for school-level reports of behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Reported to Law Enforcement						
Total	8.26 (17.29)	7.75 (15.85)	8.31 (17.90)	7.64 (15.85)	8.31 (17.38)	9.11 (18.91)
Level 1	0.82 (3.05)	0.85 (2.46)	0.87 (2.94)	0.80 (2.85)	0.80 (3.44)	0.78 (3.34)
Level 2	1.03 (2.25)	0.97 (1.95)	1.05 (2.35)	1.01 (2.39)	1.06 (2.37)	1.04 (2.17)
Level 3	5.24 (11.67)	4.90 (10.80)	5.39 (12.50)	5.03 (11.58)	5.31 (11.85)	5.51 (11.53)
Level 4	1.17 (4.42)	1.03 (3.52)	1.00 (3.18)	0.80 (2.49)	1.14 (4.06)	1.78 (6.90)
Alcohol	0.23 (0.88)	0.22 (0.85)	0.26 (1.00)	0.23 (0.88)	0.25 (0.88)	0.20 (0.78)
Arson	0.02 (0.18)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.22)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.15)
Battery - Aggravated/Felony	0.78 (2.98)	0.81 (2.42)	0.84 (2.87)	0.77 (2.73)	0.77 (3.41)	0.75 (3.28)
Breaking and Entering/Burglary	0.02 (0.22)	0.02 (0.21)	0.02 (0.17)	0.03 (0.22)	0.03 (0.25)	0.02 (0.22)
Bullying	0.13 (0.62)	0.14 (0.66)	0.15 (0.77)	0.12 (0.52)	0.14 (0.61)	0.10 (0.52)
Disruption on Campus-Major	0.87 (3.96)	0.78 (3.60)	0.98 (5.20)	0.90 (4.10)	0.88 (3.58)	0.82 (3.13)
Drug Sale/Distribution Excluding Alcohol	0.20 (0.67)	0.21 (0.71)	0.18 (0.62)	0.17 (0.57)	0.19 (0.68)	0.22 (0.74)
Drug Use/Possession Excluding Alcohol	1.98 (5.13)	1.84 (4.56)	1.84 (4.51)	1.73 (4.36)	1.98 (5.07)	2.43 (6.54)
Fighting	0.66 (2.46)	0.67 (2.32)	0.72 (2.52)	0.65 (2.36)	0.70 (3.00)	0.57 (2.00)
Harassment	0.07 (0.44)	0.07 (0.46)	0.08 (0.48)	0.08 (0.43)	0.07 (0.40)	0.07 (0.43)
Hazing	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)
Homicide	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Kidnapping	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Larceny/Theft	0.27 (0.99)	0.32 (1.05)	0.37 (1.27)	0.32 (1.16)	0.22 (0.75)	0.15 (0.58)
Other Major	0.26 (1.33)	0.25 (1.48)	0.28 (1.68)	0.27 (1.41)	0.26 (1.00)	0.26 (1.03)
Physical Attack	0.27 (1.34)	0.12 (0.67)	0.26 (1.46)	0.26 (1.60)	0.34 (1.49)	0.34 (1.25)
Robbery	0.03 (0.26)	0.03 (0.24)	0.04 (0.31)	0.04 (0.27)	0.03 (0.23)	0.03 (0.22)
Sexual Assault	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)
Sexual Battery	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.13)	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.13)
Sexual Harassment	0.19 (0.80)	0.17 (0.74)	0.17 (0.70)	0.20 (0.91)	0.20 (0.87)	0.20 (0.77)
Sexual Offenses (Other)	0.24	0.19	0.28	0.24	0.27	0.22

	(0.85)	(0.70)	(1.02)	(0.90)	(0.87)	(0.76)
Threat/Intimidation	0.66	0.55	0.64	0.63	0.71	0.76
	(1.89)	(1.81)	(1.98)	(2.02)	(1.76)	(1.89)
Tobacco-Nicotine	0.74	0.59	0.51	0.36	0.69	1.42
	(3.82)	(2.80)	(2.27)	(1.76)	(3.36)	(6.38)
Trespassing	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05
	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.29)
Vandalism	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Weapons Possession	0.50	0.58	0.54	0.51	0.46	0.42
	(1.15)	(1.27)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.12)	(1.01)
Observations	9,972	1,840	1,922	1,924	2,064	2,222

Table 9. Means and standard deviations for district-level reports of school arrests

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
School Arrests						
Total	118.20 (154.87)	140.91 (194.39)	118.94 (164.96)	106.16 (136.95)	107.91 (133.14)	117.07 (138.23)
Black	60.61 (89.75)	74.13 (113.95)	63.42 (97.10)	56.48 (80.77)	55.64 (79.09)	53.39 (72.71)
White	38.35 (46.16)	43.99 (54.01)	36.99 (47.97)	32.33 (38.44)	35.72 (40.86)	42.73 (48.16)
Hispanic	18.76 (34.19)	22.28 (43.38)	18.12 (34.75)	17.03 (30.09)	16.22 (26.82)	20.15 (34.31)
Other Race	0.48 (1.06)	0.51 (1.22)	0.42 (0.86)	0.33 (0.81)	0.33 (0.61)	0.81 (1.50)
Felony	48.65 (67.57)	52.01 (77.50)	46.66 (66.63)	43.84 (60.61)	44.43 (55.80)	56.31 (75.87)
Misdemeanor	69.55 (93.09)	88.90 (122.05)	72.28 (102.55)	62.33 (82.21)	63.48 (80.93)	60.76 (67.68)
Agg. Assault/Battery	16.51 (23.35)	17.87 (26.71)	17.51 (25.79)	14.96 (21.33)	15.51 (20.81)	16.72 (22.06)
Alcohol Offenses	0.73 (1.36)	0.82 (1.56)	0.85 (1.63)	0.58 (1.09)	0.66 (1.05)	0.73 (1.39)
Armed Robbery	0.08 (0.43)	0.12 (0.56)	0.10 (0.46)	0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.32)	0.10 (0.53)
Arson	0.33 (0.82)	0.27 (0.77)	0.49 (1.04)	0.21 (0.54)	0.36 (0.95)	0.31 (0.68)
Assault/Battery	22.38 (29.47)	26.31 (35.70)	22.58 (30.89)	20.42 (25.28)	22.09 (29.49)	20.49 (25.19)
Att. Murder/Manslaughter	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.17)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Auto Theft	0.35 (0.84)	0.31 (0.84)	0.45 (0.99)	0.40 (0.92)	0.30 (0.74)	0.27 (0.66)
Burglary	4.79 (8.69)	5.81 (11.17)	4.85 (7.85)	5.99 (10.40)	4.10 (6.33)	3.18 (6.46)
Disorderly Conduct	17.62 (25.75)	22.45 (32.47)	17.24 (27.89)	15.49 (23.35)	16.64 (23.54)	16.28 (19.84)
Escape	0.02 (0.18)	0.04 (0.27)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.24)
Felony Drug	8.25 (17.44)	6.43 (9.68)	4.79 (7.25)	5.01 (7.16)	6.31 (8.41)	18.72 (33.62)
Felony Vandalism	0.58 (1.25)	0.76 (1.56)	0.54 (1.17)	0.61 (1.22)	0.63 (1.35)	0.37 (0.85)
Fraud Forgery Counterfeit	0.56 (1.84)	0.18 (0.52)	0.19 (0.56)	0.19 (0.47)	0.99 (2.48)	1.25 (3.01)
Grand Larceny (excl Auto Theft)	4.44 (6.54)	6.10 (8.48)	5.57 (7.54)	4.49 (6.49)	3.57 (4.85)	2.45 (3.59)
Hunt Fish Boat Laws	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01



	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.12)
Kidnapping	0.19	0.19	0.06	0.28	0.22	0.18
	(0.67)	(0.70)	(0.30)	(0.92)	(0.69)	(0.60)
Loitering Prowling	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.03
	(0.22)	(0.00)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.17)
Misd. Obstruct Justice	1.54	2.07	1.52	1.42	1.24	1.45
	(3.14)	(5.29)	(2.63)	(2.53)	(1.84)	(2.21)
Misd. Sex Offenses	0.58	0.57	0.73	0.52	0.61	0.45
	(1.31)	(1.10)	(1.73)	(1.17)	(1.41)	(1.05)
Misd. Weapon/Firearm	0.25	0.40	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.31
	(0.65)	(0.85)	(0.48)	(0.55)	(0.45)	(0.78)
Misdemeanor Drug	15.93	22.09	17.64	14.30	12.93	12.67
	(28.94)	(42.36)	(35.90)	(22.56)	(18.60)	(15.34)
Murder/Manslaughter	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.27)
Non-Felony Traffic Offenses	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obstruct Justice	0.41	0.37	0.49	0.43	0.33	0.45
	(0.94)	(1.03)	(0.98)	(0.86)	(0.68)	(1.12)
Obstruct Justice Violent	0.53	0.60	0.63	0.33	0.48	0.61
	(1.21)	(1.36)	(1.44)	(0.66)	(1.08)	(1.36)
Other Fel. Sex Offense	1.35	1.60	1.19	1.06	1.42	1.49
	(2.34)	(2.55)	(2.13)	(2.07)	(2.28)	(2.62)
Other Misdemeanors	0.41	0.45	0.36	0.40	0.45	0.42
	(0.92)	(0.96)	(0.79)	(0.72)	(1.29)	(0.76)
Other Robbery	1.29	1.34	1.49	1.39	1.25	0.96
	(3.22)	(3.55)	(3.74)	(3.10)	(3.10)	(2.56)
Petit Larceny	3.13	4.43	3.75	3.19	2.30	2.00
	(4.86)	(6.82)	(5.12)	(4.57)	(3.55)	(3.04)
Sexual Battery	0.48	0.58	0.51	0.42	0.51	0.37
	(1.13)	(1.44)	(1.35)	(1.00)	(1.05)	(0.69)
Stolen Property	0.21	0.40	0.28	0.15	0.07	0.16
	(0.67)	(1.06)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.40)	(0.59)
Trespassing	5.27	7.06	5.61	4.36	4.87	4.48
	(9.68)	(13.81)	(10.23)	(7.50)	(8.32)	(6.97)
Vandalism	1.66	2.22	1.76	1.40	1.46	1.43
	(2.36)	(2.85)	(2.63)	(1.95)	(2.39)	(1.77)
Weapon/Firearm	7.02	8.16	6.64	6.88	6.58	6.85
	(11.50)	(15.27)	(10.69)	(11.28)	(9.80)	(9.84)
"Other" Felony	1.24	0.85	0.81	1.00	1.73	1.79
	(2.21)	(1.37)	(1.66)	(1.56)	(2.92)	(2.84)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Table 10. Means and standard deviations for school-level reports of school arrests

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
School Arrests						
Total	2.55 (5.78)	2.94 (6.31)	2.68 (6.12)	2.34 (5.24)	2.39 (5.42)	2.42 (5.78)
Black	1.20 (3.50)	1.40 (3.84)	1.31 (3.77)	1.15 (3.16)	1.15 (3.38)	1.03 (3.32)
White	0.92 (2.30)	1.02 (2.42)	0.93 (2.39)	0.80 (2.07)	0.89 (2.09)	0.98 (2.49)
Hispanic	0.41 (1.35)	0.51 (1.64)	0.43 (1.39)	0.38 (1.26)	0.35 (1.12)	0.39 (1.30)
Other Race	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.13)	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.16)
Felony	0.99 (2.35)	1.00 (2.30)	0.97 (2.36)	0.89 (2.05)	0.94 (2.11)	1.13 (2.79)
Misdemeanor	1.55 (3.91)	1.94 (4.48)	1.70 (4.18)	1.45 (3.59)	1.45 (3.72)	1.29 (3.56)
Agg. Assault/Battery	0.30 (0.93)	0.29 (0.99)	0.33 (1.04)	0.27 (0.82)	0.29 (0.85)	0.31 (0.93)
Alcohol Offenses	0.02 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.19)
Armed Robbery	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Arson	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)
Assault/Battery	0.49 (1.40)	0.54 (1.52)	0.50 (1.37)	0.46 (1.34)	0.50 (1.41)	0.44 (1.35)
Att. Murder/Manslaughter	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Auto Theft	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)
Burglary	0.10 (0.53)	0.12 (0.57)	0.11 (0.56)	0.13 (0.59)	0.10 (0.51)	0.07 (0.39)
Disorderly Conduct	0.39 (1.58)	0.47 (1.63)	0.41 (1.73)	0.35 (1.46)	0.38 (1.64)	0.34 (1.44)
Escape	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.03)
Felony Drug	0.18 (0.90)	0.13 (0.50)	0.10 (0.43)	0.10 (0.45)	0.14 (0.60)	0.38 (1.64)
Felony Vandalism	0.01 (0.14)	0.01 (0.17)	0.02 (0.15)	0.02 (0.17)	0.01 (0.13)	0.00 (0.09)
Fraud Forgery Counterfeit	0.01 (0.16)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.21)	0.03 (0.25)
Grand Larceny (excl Auto Theft)	0.10 (0.45)	0.13 (0.51)	0.13 (0.47)	0.12 (0.54)	0.09 (0.41)	0.05 (0.29)
Hunt Fish Boat Laws	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.02)
Kidnapping	0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.08)
Loitering Prowling	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)
Misd. Obstruct Justice	0.03 (0.22)	0.05 (0.28)	0.04 (0.22)	0.03 (0.20)	0.03 (0.19)	0.03 (0.22)
Misd. Sex Offenses	0.01 (0.17)	0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.26)	0.01 (0.14)	0.02 (0.17)	0.01 (0.13)
Misd. Weapon/Firearm	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)
Misdemeanor Drug	0.38 (1.21)	0.54 (1.53)	0.44 (1.44)	0.35 (1.09)	0.30 (0.95)	0.28 (0.95)
Murder/Manslaughter	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.04)
Non-Felony Traffic Offenses	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Obstruct Justice	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)
Obstruct Justice Violent	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)
Other Fel. Sex Offense	0.03 (0.19)	0.03 (0.20)	0.02 (0.18)	0.02 (0.18)	0.03 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)

Other Misdemeanors	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)
Other Robbery	0.03 (0.23)	0.02 (0.22)	0.03 (0.27)	0.03 (0.27)	0.02 (0.21)	0.02 (0.17)
Petit Larceny	0.08 (0.38)	0.11 (0.52)	0.09 (0.42)	0.08 (0.37)	0.05 (0.29)	0.05 (0.27)
Sexual Battery	0.01 (0.13)	0.01 (0.17)	0.01 (0.13)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.14)	0.01 (0.10)
Stolen Property	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)
Trespassing	0.12 (0.54)	0.14 (0.67)	0.13 (0.57)	0.10 (0.44)	0.12 (0.50)	0.09 (0.50)
Vandalism	0.03 (0.20)	0.04 (0.24)	0.03 (0.22)	0.03 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)	0.02 (0.17)
Weapon/Firearm	0.15 (0.54)	0.18 (0.65)	0.15 (0.55)	0.14 (0.51)	0.14 (0.49)	0.14 (0.52)
"Other" Felony	0.03 (0.21)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.17)	0.02 (0.18)	0.04 (0.26)	0.04 (0.24)
Observations	9,972	1,840	1,922	1,924	2,064	2,222

Table 11. Means and standard deviations for district-level reports of school discipline

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Disciplinary Outcomes						
OSS	2255.55 (3062.70)	2467.79 (3482.24)	2260.04 (3125.28)	2075.48 (2780.29)	2160.99 (2903.99)	2313.45 (3053.11)
ISS	2832.82 (4010.86)	2998.75 (4609.49)	2884.07 (4178.79)	2790.91 (3905.23)	2681.10 (3613.05)	2809.28 (3786.69)
OSS – White Students	699.58 (801.60)	728.58 (821.19)	690.78 (809.47)	653.88 (761.21)	686.39 (794.87)	738.25 (840.36)
OSS – Black Students	937.98 (1528.06)	1053.15 (1744.30)	973.16 (1604.72)	864.76 (1372.94)	882.87 (1445.90)	915.97 (1482.99)
OSS – Hispanic Students	505.70 (949.80)	576.21 (1219.92)	486.28 (908.34)	450.99 (819.68)	478.15 (842.88)	536.90 (927.09)
Physical Restraint	13.43 (27.16)	9.72 (21.60)	9.09 (19.54)	7.94 (17.73)	7.57 (15.89)	32.82 (42.85)
Observations	335	67	67	67	67	67

Table 12. Means and standard deviations for school-level reports of school discipline

	Full Sample	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Disciplinary Outcomes						
OSS	50.50 (69.40)	. .	. .	. .	49.84 (68.47)	51.11 (70.27)
ISS	61.54 (102.49)	. .	. .	. .	62.24 (103.11)	60.89 (101.93)
OSS – White Students	22.78 (29.73)	. .	. .	. .	22.72 (28.54)	22.83 (30.79)
OSS – Black Students	24.01 (35.73)	. .	. .	. .	24.02 (35.84)	23.99 (35.64)
OSS – Hispanic Students	15.14 (26.63)	. .	. .	. .	15.02 (26.09)	15.25 (27.13)
Physical Restraint	0.25 (1.42)	. .	. .	. .	0.09 (1.01)	0.40 (1.70)
Observations	9,972				2,064	2,222

Note. School-level discipline data was only available from the state from 2017-18 onward

Table 13. Regression coefficients and standard errors from models predicting behavioral incidents from officer presence for district-level and school-level analyses overall and by incident severity level

	Total Incidents		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: District-Level Analysis										
# Schools Served	0.00337** (0.00112)	0.00143* (0.000612)	5.09e-05 (0.00258)	-0.00129* (0.000600)	0.00562** (0.00132)	0.00370** (0.000637)	0.00305* (0.00119)	0.00136+ (0.000810)	0.00263* (0.00104)	0.000182 (0.000412)
Constant	4.225** (1.031)	-0.424 (2.759)	-0.980 (1.605)	-11.46** (4.109)	-0.299 (3.034)	-3.136 (6.367)	2.893** (0.832)	-6.175+ (3.533)	4.403** (0.971)	5.482+ (3.274)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Observations	335	335	309	309	329	329	335	335	331	331
Panel B: School-Level Analysis										
Officer Served	1.385** (0.0359)	1.024 (0.0419)	1.642** (0.116)	0.978 (0.122)	1.429** (0.0643)	1.230** (0.0977)	1.513** (0.0458)	1.006 (0.0482)	1.273** (0.0455)	0.933 (0.0590)
Constant	0.169** (0.00890)	0.887 (0.104)	0.0258** (0.00370)	0.488+ (0.207)	0.0659** (0.00595)	0.355** (0.0742)	0.111** (0.00657)	0.858 (0.115)	0.200** (0.0142)	0.985 (0.170)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
School Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	9,609	9,002	9,609	4,535	9,609	6,887	9,609	8,467	9,609	7,918

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered in district-level analysis. Sample sizes vary due to some districts with zero disciplinary incidents for outcome which is undefined when log transformed and some schools with all zero outcomes over time. Results in Panel A are from OLS regression with log transformed outcome, and results in Panel B are incidence rate ratios from conditional fixed effect negative binomial regressions. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1



Table 14. Regression coefficients and standard errors from models predicting behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement from officer presence for district-level and school-level analyses overall and by incident severity level

	Reports to Law Enf.		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: District-Level Analysis										
# Schools Served	0.00312** (0.00115)	0.00110** (0.000319)	2.69e-05 (0.00257)	-0.00130* (0.000616)	0.00501** (0.000902)	0.00295** (0.000418)	0.00286* (0.00114)	0.000907* (0.000382)	0.00572** (0.00186)	0.00400** (0.00115)
Constant	2.127+ (1.123)	0.934 (4.655)	-0.996 (1.618)	-11.65** (4.212)	-0.633 (1.257)	3.052 (5.946)	1.244 (1.214)	0.478 (5.324)	-5.147** (1.841)	6.696 (6.286)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	335	335	308	308	319	319	333	333	296	296
Panel B: School-Level Analysis										
Officer Served	1.648** (0.0572)	1.257** (0.0728)	1.655** (0.118)	0.988 (0.124)	1.981** (0.114)	1.354** (0.147)	1.483** (0.0603)	1.186* (0.0821)	1.745** (0.138)	1.692** (0.233)
Constant	0.0946** (0.00628)	0.900 (0.155)	0.0250** (0.00362)	0.500 (0.216)	0.0794** (0.00865)	0.545+ (0.183)	0.0785** (0.00590)	1.078 (0.217)	0.0567** (0.00740)	0.350** (0.115)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
School Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	9,609	7,881	9,609	4,474	9,594	5,975	9,609	7,008	9,594	4,121

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered in district-level analysis. Sample sizes vary due to some districts with zero disciplinary incidents for outcome which is undefined when log transformed and some schools with all zero outcomes over time. Results in Panel A are from OLS regression with log transformed outcome, and results in Panel B are incidence rate ratios from conditional fixed effect negative binomial regressions. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 15. Regression coefficients and standard errors from models predicting public school arrests from officer presence for district-level and school-level analyses

	Total Arrests		Felonies		Misdemeanors		White		Black		Hispanic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: District-Level Analysis												
# Schools Served	0.00167+	0.000713	0.00128	0.000145	0.00212*	0.00162	0.00351*	0.00150	0.00145+	0.000905	0.00223+	0.00116
	(0.000904)	(0.000795)	(0.000829)	(0.000691)	(0.00106)	(0.00108)	(0.00152)	(0.00145)	(0.000861)	(0.000684)	(0.00120)	(0.000998)
Constant	-0.515	1.883	-0.521	-0.0800	-2.012*	1.308	-3.361**	-1.002	-2.320*	0.331	-4.729**	-1.460
	(0.780)	(4.315)	(0.778)	(4.135)	(0.896)	(4.840)	(0.967)	(5.978)	(0.966)	(3.483)	(1.037)	(6.613)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	331	331	319	319	327	327	326	326	313	313	243	243
Panel B: School-Level Analysis												
Officer Served	1.823**	1.401**	1.676**	1.439**	2.038**	1.399*	1.875**	1.376*	1.751**	1.136	2.069**	1.306
	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.121)	(0.183)	(0.157)	(0.189)	(0.151)	(0.198)	(0.134)	(0.150)	(0.293)	(0.320)
Constant	0.0383**	0.862	0.0410**	0.400*	0.0248**	0.729	0.0628**	0.929	0.0138**	0.720	0.0126**	1.407
	(0.00406)	(0.243)	(0.00548)	(0.169)	(0.00326)	(0.242)	(0.00870)	(0.385)	(0.00201)	(0.302)	(0.00271)	(2.053)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
School Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	9,609	5,517	9,609	4,750	9,609	4,431	9,549	4,214	9,609	4,289	9,372	2,915

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered in district-level analysis. Sample sizes vary due to some districts with zero disciplinary incidents for outcome which is undefined when log transformed and some schools with all zero outcomes over time. Results in Panel A are from OLS regression with log transformed outcome, and results in Panel B are incidence rate ratios from conditional fixed effect negative binomial regressions. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 16. Regression coefficients and standard errors from models predicting disciplinary outcomes from officer presence for district-level and school-level analyses

	OSS		ISS		OSS - White		OSS - Black		OSS - Hispanic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: District-Level Analysis										
# Schools Served	0.00246 (0.00170)	0.000325 (0.00109)	0.00184+ (0.000989)	-0.000256 (0.000368)	0.00289 (0.00202)	-0.000153 (0.00101)	0.00220 (0.00197)	0.000384 (0.00130)	0.00316+ (0.00189)	-6.36e-05 (0.00109)
Constant	2.811* (1.098)	-8.648 (7.338)	4.410** (1.220)	4.836+ (2.646)	2.385+ (1.223)	-6.660 (6.654)	0.167 (1.119)	-15.68+ (8.949)	-1.831 (1.227)	-7.619 (7.050)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	335	335	331	331	335	335	335	335	333	333
Panel B: School-Level Analysis										
Officer Served	1.149** (0.0401)	1.035 (0.0507)	1.308** (0.0549)	0.932 (0.0650)	1.258** (0.0471)	1.050 (0.0415)	1.073+ (0.0443)	1.050 (0.0535)	1.139** (0.0491)	0.990 (0.0588)
Constant	0.171** (0.0115)	1.752** (0.370)	0.0602** (0.00514)	1.297 (0.285)	0.736** (0.0547)	8.362** (3.131)	0.101** (0.00862)	4.188** (1.409)	0.243** (0.0196)	3.725** (1.597)
Observable Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
School Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	4,162	3,764	4,162	3,428	3,161	2,508	3,161	2,502	3,158	2,484

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. SE are clustered in district-level analysis. Sample sizes vary due to some districts with zero disciplinary incidents for outcome which is undefined when log transformed and some schools with all zero outcomes over time. Results in Panel A are from OLS regression with log transformed outcome, and results in Panel B are incidence rate ratios from conditional fixed effect negative binomial regressions. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

## Appendix A. School district coverage in school-level analyses

<b>School District</b>	<b>School-Level Analysis Coverage</b>
Alachua	Complete
Baker	Complete
Bay	Partial – Only available for 17-18 and 18-19 school years
Bradford	Complete - Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Brevard	Partial– Only available for 17-18 and 18-19 school years
Broward	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Calhoun	Complete
Charlotte	Complete
Citrus	Complete – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Clay	Complete
Collier	Complete – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Columbia	Complete
Desoto	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Dixie	Complete
Duval	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Escambia	Complete
Flagler	Partial– Not available for 14-15 school year
Franklin	Complete
Gadsden	Complete
Gilchrist	Complete
Glades	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Gulf	Complete
Hamilton	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Hardee	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Hendry	Complete
Hernando	Complete
Highlands	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Hillsborough	Complete
Holmes	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data

Indian River	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Jackson	Complete
Jefferson	Complete – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Lafayette	Complete
Lake	Complete – No data on charter schools
Lee	Complete
Leon	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Levy	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Liberty	Complete
Madison	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Manatee	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Marion	Complete
Martin	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Miami-Dade	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Monroe	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Nassau	Complete – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Okaloosa	Complete
Okeechobee	Complete
Orange	Complete
Osceola	Complete
Palm Beach	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Pasco	Complete
Pinellas	Complete
Polk	Complete
Putnam	School district and law enforcement agencies did not provide data
Santa Rosa	Complete
Sarasota	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies
Seminole	Complete
St. Johns	Complete
St. Lucie	Complete – Provided by school district and local law enforcement agency
Sumter	Complete

Suwannee	Complete
Taylor	Complete
Union	Complete
Volusia	Partial – Not available for 14-15 school year
Wakulla	Complete
Walton	Complete
Washington	Partial – Provided by local law enforcement agencies



Appendix Table B1. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting total reported behavioral incidents and incidents by level for district-level analysis

	Total Incidents		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE
<b># of Schools Served</b>										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00337**	0.00143*	5.09e-05	-0.00129*	0.00562**	0.00370**	0.00305*	0.00136+	0.00263*	0.000182
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00701**	0.000521	0.00490	-0.00195	0.00745**	0.00223**	0.00724**	0.000501	0.00543*	-0.000215
Weighted OLS	8.824*	11.38**	-0.111	-0.109	3.463+	4.303**	2.680	4.581+	2.792**	2.601**
Unweighted OLS	13.37**	8.282**	0.281	-0.185	3.829	3.211*	7.226**	1.996+	2.035**	3.260*
Poisson	0.00394**	0.00122*	0.00307	-0.00143*	0.00823**	0.00198+	0.00350**	0.000696	0.00222*	-9.94e-05
Negative Binomial	1.009**	1.001	1.011+	0.999	1.009**	1.002+	1.008**	1.001	1.007*	1.000
<b># of Officers</b>										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00151+	0.00135	-0.00201	-0.00219**	0.00194	0.00339**	0.00208**	0.00178	0.000258	-0.000398
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00234	-0.00105	0.000267	-0.00279+	0.00143	-4.88e-05	0.00326*	-0.000497	0.00160	-0.000943
Weighted OLS	5.967+	14.72**	-0.144	-0.107	-0.546	3.765**	2.642	6.734**	4.016**	4.326**
Unweighted OLS	5.131	5.338	0.0563	-0.177	-1.974	0.0834	3.258	0.554	3.792**	4.877**
Poisson	0.000830	0.00102	0.000777	-0.00223**	-0.00271	0.00287	0.00183+	0.000982	0.000816	-0.000534
Negative Binomial	1.002	1.000	1.001	0.998*	1.001	1.000	1.003	1.000	1.002	1.000

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with or without district fixed effects. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B2. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting total behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement and incidents by level for district-level analysis

	Incidents Reported to Law Enforcement		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE
# of Schools Served										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00312**	0.00110**	2.69e-05	-0.00130*	0.00501**	0.00295**	0.00286*	0.000907*	0.00572**	0.00400**
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00595*	-8.09e-05	0.00475	-0.00210	0.00612**	0.00149+	0.00593*	0.000414	0.00817*	0.00194
Weighted OLS	3.096**	2.088**	-0.113	-0.108	1.289**	1.084**	1.729**	1.184**	0.191	-0.0717
Unweighted OLS	4.749**	1.758*	0.276	-0.185	1.043**	0.815**	2.873*	1.167*	0.557	-0.0386
Poisson	0.00402**	0.000925*	0.00307	-0.00144*	0.00533**	0.00244**	0.00387**	0.00106*	0.00746**	-0.000987
Negative Binomial	1.010*	0.999	1.011+	0.999	1.007**	1.001	1.010*	0.999	1.019**	1.002
# of Officers										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00117	-0.000285	-0.00199	-0.00224**	0.00316*	0.00189	0.00108	-0.000482	0.00584**	0.00277
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.000864	-0.00214+	0.000232	-0.00296*	0.00197	-0.00102	0.00116	-0.00127	0.00104	0.00105
Weighted OLS	2.685**	1.393	-0.144	-0.107	1.244**	1.040**	1.595**	0.615	-0.0102	-0.155
Unweighted OLS	2.668**	0.789	0.0556	-0.177	0.565+	0.333	1.662**	0.506	0.385	0.127
Poisson	0.00160+	-0.000887	0.000794	-0.00226**	0.00375**	0.00196+	0.00181+	-0.000775	0.00166	-0.00384+
Negative Binomial	1.000	0.998*	1.001	0.998*	1.003	0.992**	1.000	0.999+	0.999	1.000

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with or without district fixed effects. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B3. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting school arrests for district-level analysis

	Total Arrests		Felonies		Misdemeanors		White		Black		Hispanic	
	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE
<b># of Schools Served</b>												
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00167+	0.000713	0.00128	0.000145	0.00212*	0.00162	0.00351*	0.00150	0.00145+	0.000905	0.00223+	0.00116
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00383+	-0.000116	0.00389*	-0.000445	0.00417+	0.000326	0.00748**	0.00122	0.00318	-0.000212	0.00525*	0.000576
Weighted OLS	0.182	-0.0237	0.0493	0.0137	0.133	-0.0373	0.0311	-0.0941+	0.142	0.0332	0.0119	0.0409
Unweighted OLS	0.685	-0.0936	0.251*	0.0429	0.435	-0.137	0.247	-0.0314	0.410*	-0.0597	0.0254	-0.00497
Poisson	0.00231+	-4.25e-05	0.00194*	-0.000113	0.00267	-7.46e-05	0.00351*	-0.000722	0.00226+	0.000139	0.00252*	-0.000147
Negative Binomial	1.006+	1.000	1.006*	1.000	0.0119	0.0409	1.009*	1.000	1.005	1.000	1.008*	0.999
<b># of Officers</b>												
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.000733	0.000653	0.000104	0.000191	0.00128	0.00143	0.00416**	0.00238*	0.000415	0.000893	0.00204*	0.000305
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.000119	-0.000718	0.000996	-0.000872	-0.000554	-0.000980	0.00424*	0.00110	-0.000219	-0.000940	0.00228	-0.000463
Weighted OLS	0.0890	0.0341	0.0879+	0.120+	0.00109	-0.0864	0.0151	-0.0794	0.0472	0.0217	0.0318	0.0984
Unweighted OLS	0.0738	-0.148	0.193**	0.117	-0.119	-0.265*	0.143+	0.0210	-0.0736	-0.204*	0.00171	0.0335
Poisson	0.000250	-0.000678	0.000297	-0.000571	-0.000112	-0.00115	0.00140	-0.000915	-0.000223	-0.000528	0.00129	-0.000686
Negative Binomial	1.000	1.000	1.001	1.000	0.999	0.999	1.002	1.000	0.999	1.000	0.999	0.998

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with or without district fixed effects. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B4. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting school discipline for district-level analysis

	OSS		ISS		OSS - White		OSS - Black		OSS - Hispanic	
	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE	w/o FE	w/ FE
<b># of Schools Served</b>										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.00246	0.000325	0.00184+	-0.000256	0.00289	-0.000153	0.00220	0.000384	0.00316+	-6.36e-05
Unweighted OLS w/ logged outcome	0.00592*	-0.000974**	0.00425*	-0.000315	0.00701**	-0.00135**	0.00625*	-0.00132*	0.00717*	-0.00148**
Weighted OLS	7.683	-0.613	-5.254	-3.422	2.593	-0.954*	4.599	-0.239	-0.0334	0.728
Unweighted OLS	24.37*	-6.103*	8.830	-5.213	5.746+	-0.861*	13.44**	-3.156	4.108	-2.004**
Poisson	0.00387**	-0.00118**	0.00200*	-0.000453	0.00489**	-0.00114**	0.00414**	-0.00138**	0.00357*	-0.000841
Negative Binomial	1.008*	0.999	1.006*	1.000	1.010*	0.999+	1.008*	1.000	1.010*	0.998**
<b># of Officers</b>										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.000422	0.00138	0.000749	-0.000510	0.000748	0.000854	-2.91e-06	0.00152	0.00107	0.00106
Unweighted OLS w/ logged outcome	0.00140	-0.000772+	0.00188	-0.000640	0.00186	-0.000777	0.00116	-0.00119*	0.00108	-0.00117
Weighted OLS	-2.739	6.376	-7.503+	-2.980	0.234	-0.520	-1.340	2.743	-1.683	4.220
Unweighted OLS	6.250	-2.234	-3.367	-7.637*	1.456	-0.0508	2.705	-1.741	1.729	-0.500
Poisson	0.00109	-0.000788	-3.65e-05	-0.000981	0.000993	-0.000842+	0.00117	-0.00103	0.00204	0.000323
Negative Binomial	1.002	1.000	1.001	0.999	1.002	1.000	1.002	1.001	1.000	1.000

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with or without district fixed effects. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B5. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting reported behavioral incidents for school-level analysis

	Total Incidents		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE
Officer Served										
Negative Binomial	1.385**	1.024	1.642**	0.978	1.429**	1.230**	1.513**	1.006	1.273**	0.933
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.234**	-0.119	0.376**	-0.00805	0.0120	0.0885	0.311**	-0.133	0.179**	-0.145
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.254**	-0.137*	0.406**	0.0316	0.0201	-0.0225	0.336**	-0.173*	0.176**	-0.124
Weighted OLS	8.327**	-8.967**	1.423**	0.123	1.181**	-0.307	3.792**	-4.181**	1.931**	-4.602**
Unweighted OLS	7.108**	-6.339**	1.215**	0.109	0.861*	-0.515*	3.492**	-3.263**	1.540**	-2.670**
Poisson	0.376*	-0.265**	0.786*	0.394*	0.0228	0.00772	0.485**	-0.321**	0.343**	-0.150
# of Officers										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.102*	-0.0854+	0.173**	0.0449	0.127**	-0.0398	0.141**	-0.114*	-0.0615	-0.0826
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.155**	-0.145**	0.226**	0.0344	0.0694	-0.123	0.223**	-0.176**	0.0137	-0.136+
Weighted OLS	3.739*	-6.352**	0.951**	0.0631	0.815*	-0.683*	2.059+	-2.892*	-0.0869	-2.840*
Unweighted OLS	5.475**	-6.176**	0.983**	0.0849	0.569+	-0.947**	3.518**	-2.848**	0.405	-2.466**
Poisson	0.153	-0.0788	0.395**	0.150	0.160	-0.133+	0.157	-0.136*	0.0429	0.0180
Negative Binomial	1.139**	1.017	1.366**	1.010	1.250**	0.980	1.162**	1.028	1.009	0.917+

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with district or school FE. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B6. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting behavioral incidents reported to law enforcement for school-level analysis

	Incidents Reported to Law Enforcement		Level 1		Level 2		Level 3		Level 4	
	District	School	District	School	District	School	District	School	District	School
	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
# of Schools Served										
Negative Binomial	1.648**	1.257**	1.655**	0.988	1.981**	1.354**	1.483**	1.186*	1.745**	1.692**
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.408**	0.193*	0.361**	-0.00217	0.0358	0.149	0.354**	0.123	0.268**	0.0535
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.445**	0.199*	0.397**	0.0434	0.0629	0.114	0.409**	0.123	0.294**	0.0613
Weighted OLS	8.042**	-1.084+	1.420**	0.123	0.264*	0.0477	4.429**	-0.487	1.928**	-0.767**
Unweighted OLS	6.662**	-0.277	1.213**	0.109	0.319**	0.0543	3.764**	-0.0422	1.366**	-0.398*
Poisson	0.673**	0.256**	0.784+	0.396*	0.685**	0.235	0.612**	0.213*	0.730*	0.471*
# of Officers										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.199**	0.102+	0.170**	0.0516	0.117**	0.0638	0.161**	0.0927	0.0567	0.0105
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.275**	0.105	0.222**	0.0453	0.110**	0.0274	0.253**	0.0820	0.0922	0.0484
Weighted OLS	4.055**	0.357	0.946**	0.0695	0.492**	0.00848	1.602*	0.570	1.016*	-0.291
Unweighted OLS	4.737**	0.204	0.978**	0.0854	0.423**	-0.0164	2.458**	0.363	0.878**	-0.228
Poisson	0.279**	0.170*	0.398**	0.150	0.224+	0.0396	0.257**	0.186**	0.354**	0.160
Negative Binomial	1.208**	1.108*	1.381**	1.012	1.237**	1.052	1.165**	1.130**	1.264**	1.207*

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with district or school FE. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1



Appendix Table B7. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting school arrests for school-level analysis

	Total Arrests		Felonies		Misdemeanors		White		Black		Hispanic	
	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE
# of Schools Served												
Negative Binomial	1.823**	1.401**	1.676**	1.439**	2.038**	1.399*	1.875**	1.376*	1.751**	1.136	2.069**	1.306
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.172**	0.113	0.0137	-0.0104	0.111	-0.0636	0.143*	0.0199	0.144+	0.0814	-0.0411	0.209
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.211**	0.0838	0.0691	0.0107	0.131+	-0.183	0.143*	0.0108	0.205**	0.0837	-0.0672	0.0272
Weighted OLS	1.496**	0.126	0.161	-0.182	1.335**	0.308	0.777**	-0.118	0.784**	0.174	-0.0707	0.0773
Unweighted OLS	1.211**	0.0712	0.227*	-0.0598	0.984**	0.131	0.594**	-0.0344	0.652**	0.0724	-0.0398	0.0377
Poisson	0.566**	0.107	0.553**	0.280*	0.542*	-0.0177	0.633**	0.164	0.521+	0.00892	0.754**	0.370
# of Officers												
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	-0.00205	0.00965	-0.0452	0.0342	-0.0963	-0.189+	-0.108+	-0.114	-0.0974	-0.106	0.000881	0.0540
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.0753	0.0110	-0.00165	0.0310	-0.0352	-0.224*	-0.0366	-0.104	0.0174	-0.0755	-0.0277	0.0118
Weighted OLS	0.274	-0.460	-0.0841	-0.341	0.358	-0.119	-0.0999	-0.371*	0.246	-0.0960	0.133	0.0122
Unweighted OLS	0.822**	-0.253	0.179+	-0.179	0.643**	-0.0744	0.161+	-0.183*	0.578**	-0.0591	0.0837	-0.00419
Poisson	0.0670	-0.0627	0.0810	0.0247	0.0467	-0.144	0.197+	-0.0641	0.00362	-0.0942	0.135	0.00797
Negative Binomial	1.099*	1.055	1.113*	1.150+	1.085+	0.988	1.193**	1.039	1.027	0.938	1.103	1.107

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with district or school FE. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Appendix Table B8. Regression coefficients for sensitivity specifications predicting school discipline for school-level analysis

	OSS		ISS		OSS - White		OSS - Black		OSS - Hispanic	
	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE	District FE	School FE
<b># of Schools Served</b>										
Negative Binomial	1.149**	1.035	1.308**	0.932	1.258**	1.050	1.073+	1.050	1.139**	0.990
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.254**	0.0181	0.446**	0.106	0.160**	0.0523	0.171**	0.081	0.152**	-0.0262
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.226**	-0.00379	0.477**	0.142	0.140**	0.0821	0.166**	0.0917	0.141**	-0.00670
Weighted OLS	32.59**	-2.272	7.492	1.528	15.80**	-1.015	10.09**	-0.303	5.385*	-1.339
Unweighted OLS	22.99**	-0.581	7.808+	1.491	11.12**	-0.106	8.375**	0.397	2.922*	-0.828
Poisson	0.226*	0.0333	0.474**	0.142*	0.218**	0.0390	0.233*	0.0396	0.193*	-0.00232
<b># of Officers</b>										
Weighted OLS with logged outcome	0.240**	-0.115	0.336**	0.0563	0.0943*	-0.0208	0.127*	0.0174	0.0766	-0.0693
Unweighted OLS with logged outcome	0.222**	-0.0944	0.391**	0.0921	0.0921*	-0.00254	0.156**	0.0431	0.105*	-0.0229
Weighted OLS	15.10**	-6.102*	20.52**	-0.440	4.139*	-2.703	8.035**	-1.100	1.369	-1.743
Unweighted OLS	15.58**	-3.430+	17.03**	0.218	4.738**	-1.478	8.027**	-0.418	1.964+	-1.044
Poisson	0.168**	-0.0131	0.186*	0.0650	0.151**	-0.00655	0.190**	0.00418	0.0649	-0.0347
Negative Binomial	1.088**	0.951	1.234**	0.934	1.130**	0.992	1.055	1.002	1.031	0.945

Note. Each coefficient is from a separate regression including observable controls, year fixed-effects, and, as specified in the column headers, either with district or school FE. Boxes highlighted in blue show statistically significant positive relationships while those in orange show statistically significant negative relationships. The primary results are those shown in the top row. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1