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Ruling in the school voucher lawsuit: Holmes v. Bush
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
RUTH D. HOLMES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN ELLIS "JEB" BUSH, et al.,
Defendants;
BRENDA McSHANE, et al.,
Intervenors/Defendants.
FLORIDA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION/ UNITED, AFT AFL-CIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants;
BRENDA McSHANE, et al.,
Intervenors/Defendants.
Case No. CV 99-3370
FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came on for final hearing on the limited issue of the facial constitutionality of the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), as provided by Section 229.0537, Florida Statutes (1999), under Article IX, Section 1, of the Florida Constitution, as challenged by Plaintiff, Holmes in Count 2 of her First Amended Complaint, and as challenged by Plaintiffs, Florida Education Association/United, in Count 1 of their complaint. No evidence was received nor considered by the Court from any party. The presentation of evidence will only be permitted at the final hearing on the remaining issues in this case, which relate to the challenge that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts as alleged in the complaints, under Article IX, Section 1, Florida Constitution, and other Florida and Federal constitutional provisions.' This Court having considered the parties' briefs, amicus curiae's brief, and having considered counsels' oral arguments, finds that section 229.0537 violates the mandate of Article IX, section 1, Florida Constitution, that the State provide a free education through a system of "public schools". By providing state funds for some students to obtain a K-12 education through private schools, as an alternative to the high quality education available through the system of free public schools, the legislature has violated the mandate of the Florida Constitution, adopted by the electorate of this state. This action began as two lawsuits brought separately by plaintiffs Ruth D. Holmes, et al., and Florida Education Association/United, et al., which were consolidated by order of the Court on November 22, 1999. Both sets of plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of section 229.0537, Florida Statutes (1999), on the following grounds: 1) Article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution, the education provision; 2) Article IX, section 6, of the Florida Constitution, the public school funding clause of the education provision; 3) Article I, 3, of the 'Florida Constitution, the religious establishment and freedom provision; and 4) the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
At a December 2, 1999, case management hearing the Court, sua sponte, determined that it could address whether section 229.0537, on its face, violates Article IX, section 1 at a final hearing without presentation of evidence. On December 8, 1999, the Court entered an order setting the briefing schedule and the final hearing date of February 24, 2000. The February 24, 2000, hearing. addressed only the narrow issue of the facial constitutionality of section 2h.0537 under Article IX, section 1 . dollars may not be used to send the children of this state to private schools as provided by the Opportunity Scholarship Program.2
Background
Article IX, section 1, as amended in 1998, provides as follows:
Public education.--The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free
public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require. ..
Section 229.0537, the Opportunity Scholarship Program, provides that a "public school. student's parent or guardian may request and receive from the state an opportunity scholarship for the child to enroll in and attend a private school in accordance with the provisions of [section 229.0537]," if the student has been assigned by school attendance area or by special assignment or attends "a public school that has been designated pursuant to s. 229.57 as performance grade category 'F,' failing to make adequate progress, and that has had two school years in a 4-year period of such low performance, and the student's attendance occurred
2 The State has challenged the capacity to sue of two of the organizations that are among the plaintiffs in the Holmes lawsuit -- the Florida State Conference of Branches of NAACP and the Citizens' Coalition for Public Schools. In view of the fact that the standing and capacity of 17 of the 19 plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuit are uncontested, and that the Court therefore necessarily must reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the Court sees no need to resolve the question of these two organizations' capacity to sue. Cf. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 403 n.4 (Fla. 1996) ("While we question the standing of the coalition, we need not discuss that issue becahe of the standing of the other plaintiffs."). during a school year in which such designation was in effect; or the parent or guardian of a student who has been in attendance elsewhere in the public school system or who is entering kindergarten or first grade has been notified that the student has been assigned to such [failing] school for the next school year." 229.0537(2)(a). Further, in order to participate in the opportunity scholarship program, the parent or guardian must obtain "acceptance for admission of the student to a private school eligible for the program pursuant to subsection (4), and ha[ve] notified the Department of Education and the school district of the request for an opportunity scholarship no later than July 1 of the,first year in which the student intends to use the scholarship." 229.0537(2)(b).
Section 229.0537(2)(b) further provides that "the opportunity scholarship shall remain in force until the student returns to a public school or, if the student chooses to attend a private school the highest grade of which is grade 8, until the student matriculates to high school and the public high school to which the student is assigned is an accredited school with a performance grade category designation of 'C' or better."
Section 229.0537(6) provides the method for calculating the amount and funding of the opportunity scholarship. The maximum amount of an opportunity scholarship is "equivalent to the base student allocation multiplied by the appropriate cost factor for the educational program that would have been provided for the student in the district school to which he or she was assigned, multiplied by the district cost differential." 229.0537(6)(a)1, Fla. Stat. This maximum amount is "transfer[red] from each school district's appropriated funds . . . from the Florida Education Finance Program and authorized categorical accounts to a separate account . . . ." 229.0537(6)(x)3. The amount of the opportunity scholarship is either this maximum amount, or the tuition and fees charged by the private school the student attends, whichever is less. Payment of the opportunity scholarship is by "individual warrant made payable to the student's parent or guardian and mailed by the Department of Education to the private school . . . ." 229.0537(6)(b). The statute then directs that the "parent or guardian shall restrictively endorse the warrant [payable] to the private school." 229.0537(6)(b).
Section 229.0537 also contains provisions requiring public school districts to allow students eligible for opportunity scholarships to enroll in higher-rated public schools in the same or an adjacent school district, 229.0537(3)(x)(2), (b), but the Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of these latter provisions.
Issue
The narrow issue before this Court is whether section 229.0537, in providing for state payment of tuition for eligible children to attend private schools, violates Article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.
Summary of Arguments
The Holmes and Florida Education Association/United plaintiffs advance the argument that Article IX, section 1, provides the exclusive manner for the State to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide for the education of Florida children. That education must be provided through a system of free public schools, institutions of higher learning, and other public education programs that may be necessary. Consequently, the legislature is prohibited from providing a free education in a different manner. The legislature is prohibited from providing a free private education and is prohibited from providing a system of free private schools.
The Defendants, Governor Bush, the State Board of Education et al., and Defend ants/Intervenors Brenda McShane et al., advance the following arguments in support of the constitutionality of section 229.0537:
First, the Defendants argue that the rule of constitutional interpretation relied on by the Plaintiffs should not apply to Article IX, section 1 because the constitution does not clearly prohibit the Legislature from providing an education through a private school, but rather provides a "floor" for legislative action, citing Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 315, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944);
Second, the Defendants argue that the Florida Supreme Court, in Scavella v. School Board of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1978), has already approved statutes authorizing state payments for private-school education of students with special needs;
3 At the February 24, 2000, hearing on the facial validity of section 229.0537, the Florida Education Association/United, et al. plaintiffs advanced two additional arguments that section 229.0537, Florida Statutes (1999) violates,the requirements of Article IX, section 1, Florida Constitution. Point II of the Florida Education Association/United brief argues that the statute violates the constitutional requirement that the State provide a uniform system of free public schools. Point III of the Florida Education Association/United brief argues the statute violates the constitutional requirement for the State to make adequate provision for the failing public schools. The Court finds that these two arguments require an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of section 229.0537, which is beyond the scope of the February 24, 2000, hearing. Thus, the.Qourt declines to address the uniformity and adequacy arguments advanced by ~lSWa Education Association/United.
Third, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' reading of Article IX, section 1 would result in numerous state programs, such as programs for dropout prevention, special education for disabled students and programs for prekindergarten students and "Bright Future" scholarships, all being unconstitutional; and
Fourth, the Defendants argue that section 229.0537 does not violate Article IX, section 1 because the statute is within the context of the constitutional provision's last clause that authorizes "other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."
Analysis and Opinion
The Florida Supreme Court has long held that "When a constitution directs how a thing shall be done, that is in effect a prohibition to its being done in any other way." State ex re/. Murphy v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29, 32, 3 So. 433, 434 (1888). The Court has reaffirmed that canon of construction in any number of subsequent decisions, and its leading case on the subject explains as follows:
The principle is well established that, where the Constitution expressly provides the manner of doing a thing, it impliedly forbids its being done in a substantially different manner. Even though the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the doing of a thing in another manner, the fact that it has prescribed the manner in which the thing shall be done is itself a prohibition against a different manner of doing it. Therefbre;when the Constitution prescribes the manner of doing an act, the manner prescribed is exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a statute that would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision.
Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 478-79, 1 12 So. 253, 256 (1927) (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also State ex rel. Church v. Yeats, 74 Fla. 509, 521-22, 77 So. 262, 263 (1917); State ex rel. Ellars v. Board of County Comm'rs, 147 Fla. 278, 282, 3 So. 2d' 360, 362 (1941); In re Investigation of a Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601, 606 (Fla. 1957); In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1975); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977).
Article IX, section 1 directs that it is a "paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders." But the Constitution also prescribes how the State is to carry out this education mandate. The sentence that imposes on the State the duty to make "adequate provision" for the education of Florida children is followed immediately by the requirement -- which can only be read as an instruction on the manner in which the State is to fulfill that duty -- that such adequate provision "shall be made" through "a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools . . ." (emphasis added).
Such constitutional prescription of the manner in which the constitutional objective shall be carried out does not allow the State to proceed other than in the constitutionally prescribed manner. And it is exactly the type of compulsory language found in Article IX, section 1 -- "shall be made" -- that the' Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly found to constitute an exclusive direction as to how a "thing shall be done." See Weinberger, 93 Fla. at 478,1 12 So. at 256 (constitutional provision stating that bonds issued pursuant to that section "shall become payable . . . in annual installments . . .() (elach annual installment shall be not less than three per cent, of the total amount of the issue" prohibited issuance of bonds with any other maturity dates (emphasis added)); Murphy, 24 Fla. at 3132, 3 So. at 433-34 (constitutional provision directirig that county officers other than school officers "shall be paid from the general funds of their respective counties" prohibited the legislature "from passing a law putting the payment of the salaries of county officers on the state" (emphasis added)). Because Article IX, section 1 directs that public education, K-12, be accomplished through a "system of free public schools," that is, in effect, a prohibition on the Legislature to provide a K-12 public education in any other way.
The Court recognizes that the principle expressio uniu,;3, est exclusio alterius -which underlies the canon of constitutional interpretation articulated in the Weinberger line of cases -- should not be applied lightly. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 315, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (1944). But as Taylor recognizes, it is the courts' duty to invalidate legislation that is contrary to an "express or implied prohibition" of the Constitution, id. at 314, 19 So. 2d at 881 (emphasis added), and in this case the negative implication is evident.
In Taylor, the court declined to find, in a constitutional provision allowing a married woman's separate property to be charged in equity to satisfy claims related to that property, an implied prohibition against the enactment of legislation making married women legally responsible for debts of other kinds. See id. at 312-17, 19 So. 2d at 880-82. It held the Weinberger line of cases inapplicable on the ground that the "primary purpose" of the constitutional provision at issue was a narrow one, and that it was not intended to regulate the contractual responsibilities of ..,.1, , married women generally. Id. at 317, 19 So. 2d at 882. Here, on the other hand, it clearly is the purpose of Article IX, section 1, to provide a comprehensive statement of the State's responsibilities with regard ~ to the education of Florida children. The constitutional purpose is not only to impose on the State the mandate to "make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders," but also to prescribe the manner in which that mandate is to be carried out: through a "system of free public schools", institutions of higher learning, and other necessary education programs.
The Court finds that the language of Article IX, section 1 mandates that a system of free public schools is the manner in which the, State is to provide a free education to the children of Florida. The Court also finds that providing a free education for Florida children by paying tuition for them to attend private schools is "a substantially different manner," Weinberger, 93 Fla. at 478, 112 So. at 256, of providing a publicly funded education than is the one prescribed by the Constitution. For these reasons the Court finds it fully appropriate to apply the principle articulated in the Weinberger line of cases.
The Court rejects defendants' interpretation that as long as the State provides a system of free public schools it has fulfilled its obligation under Article IX, section 1, and is not prohibited from doing more than what this constitutional "floor" requires. This argument misconstrues Article IX, section 1 as imposing distinct and unrelated obligations on the State, i.e., the obligation "to make adequate provision" for the education of all Florida children, and the obligation to maintain a uniform system of free public schools. The Court finds no basis for such an artificial separation of the second and third sentences of Article IX, section 1 .
When read together, the latter does not set out an additional obligation independent of the former, but rather specifies one of the three separate types of education which must be provided by the legislature, one of which must be through a system of free schools. Free schools must be public. Institutions of higher learning do not have to be provided free to the public. "Other public education programs", such as junior colleges, adult education, and vocational education are not required to be free.
Similarly, defendants' reliance on Scavella, other statutory provisions, and the Article IX, section 1 clause of "other public education programs that the needs of the people may require" is misplaced.
Scavella has no application to the instant case. The Florida Supreme Court did not even address, in that case, whether Article IX, section 1 permits public school districts to use public funds to pay for education in private schools. Scavella involved a program under which the Dade County School District paid for handicapped students to attend private schools "because of the lack of special services in the Dade County public schools to meet their special needs." 363 So. 2d at 1097. The issue in Scavella was whether placing an arbitrary cap on payments to those specialized schools was contrary to Article I, 2 of the' Florida Constitution, which then provided in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap." 363 So. 2d at 1097. The Scavella Court held that a cap set at a level that had the effect of depriving a physically disabled student of his or her right to a free education violated Article I, 2, and it remanded for further fact finding. 363 So. 2d at 1098-99. . .
The issue before the Scavella Court, and the only issue it decided, was whether the State, having chosen to send certain disabled students to specialized private schools because it was not equipped to meet their special needs in the public schools, could arbitrarily limit the amount it would pay for that private-school education without, under Article I, 2, depriving those students of their right to a free education. The question whether Article IX, section 1 allowed the State to send those students to private schools in the first place ,was not before the court. It was neither briefed nor argued, and for good reason: neither the school district, whose program was at issue, nor the students, who benefited from it, had any interest in suggesting that the program might not be constitutional under Article IX, section 1. And the Scavella Court did not reach out to decide a constitutional issue that had not been presented to it. Accordingly, Scavella is not precedent on the issue whether Article IX, section 1 allows the State to pay for certain students to receive their education in private schools. Scavella does not support the theory advanced by defendants, that Article IX, Section 1, merely specifies the "floor", which does not prohibit the legislature from doing more. If the Supreme, court had been presented the issue of whether providing any funds for such handicapped students violated Article IX, Section 1, a holding that it did not would be supported by the fact that the public schools in Dade County could not meet the special needs of such children. The Opportunity Scholarship Program does not relate to special needs children. The recipients of the Opportunity Scholarships could have their needs met at a public school rated higher than the one to which such student is assigned. 229.0537(3)(a)(2), (b), Florida Statutes.
Furthermore, Defendants' reliance on other state programs to uphold section 229.0537 under Article IX, section 1 is not well founded. Some of the programs cited by the Defendants, such as postsecondary education scholarships and prekindergarten programs, are outside the State's constitutional obligation to provide a "system of free public schools" under Article IX, section 1. Nor would the other programs cited by Defendants, through which the State pays tuition for certain types of students to attend specialized private institutions that provide services the public schools are not equipped to provide, be affected by this Court's interpretation of Article IX, section 1. See, e.g., 230.23(4)(m)(2), Fla. Stat. (programs for students with disabilities); 230.2316(3)(d), Fla. Stat. ("second chance schools" program for disruptive or violent students); 230.23161(12), Fla. Stat. (programs for students in Department of Juvenile Justice facilities). These programs do not appear to violate Article IX, section 1, because they provide specialized services to some of Florida's students who cannot readily be served in the public school system; they provide schooling not available in the system of free public schools envisioned by Article IX, section 1, and thus do not "defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision." Weinberger, 93 Fla. at 479, 112 So. at 256. Neither this court, nor any other court, has been called upon to determine their constitutionality, and the mere fact that such statutes exist has no relevance to the issue now before this court.
In contrast to such programs, the Opportunity Scholarship Program is not one under which the State pays for specialized services. Rather, the statute provides that all students at designated schools who wish to do so may leave the public school system and instead receive their publicly funded education in private schools that offer the same services as do the public schools. This program supplants the system of free public schools mandated by the Constitution.
The other programs cited by Defendants are, in any event, not before the Court, and the Court's determination that section 229.0537 violates Article IX, section 1 does not require the Court to address their constitutionality.
Defendants' final effort to find some constitutional provision to support the validity of the opportunity scholarship program is the contention that this is one of the "other public education programs that the needs of the people may require." The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Board of Public Instruction v. State Treasurer, 231 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970), soundly refutes the Defendants' argument. In Board of Public Instruction, the Court explained the meaning of the "other public education programs" language as follows:
The constitution of 1968, in section 1 article IX recognizes that there are three areas of public education (1) a uniform system of free public schools, (2) institutions of higher learning and (3) other public education programs. The latter obviously applies to the exlsWng, systems of junior colleges, adult education, etc., which are not strictly within the general conception of free public schools or institutions of higher learning. 231 So. 2d at 2 (emphasis added).
The language of Article IX, section 1 authorizes public education programs -not programs that pay for private education. The reference to "other public education programs" was not intended to allow the State to set up an alternative to the system of free public schools. Rather, as the Court made clear in Board of Public Instruction, this language was intended to refer to programs outside the scope of traditional K-12 education, such as junior college and adult education programs.
The last clause of Article IX, section 1 was added to the Constitution during the 1968 revision, as part of the process by which the separate section of the education article dealing with higher education was merged into section 1. The history cited by the Plaintiffs fully supports the Supreme Court's interpretation, and confirms that the reference in Article IX, section 1 to "other public education programs" was not intended to address traditional elementary and secondary education. There is no historical basis for Defendants' contention that the Constitutional Revision Commission in 1967 adopted and forwarded to the Legislature proposed language for Article IX, section 1, providing that "[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for the establishment, maintenance and operation of a uniform system of free public schools and institutions of higher learning." Apparently believing that the constitutional language should recognize that the State's public education system included more than public schools and four-year colleges and universities, both houses of the Legislature passed proposals that, in similar language, added a reference to "public educational institutions and programs, [and] public community junior colleges." These proposals were transformed into the language ultimately submitted to the electorate by the Legislature's Joint Subcommittee on Style and Drafting. This language deleted the specific reference to "public community junior colleges," and included such institutions along with other nontraditional components of the State's public education system, such as adult education programs, in the more general reference to "other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."
The subcommittee's note accompanying its draft stated simply: "Reworded for styling and preserves the intent expressed in both drafts." The language adopted by the subcommittee was enacted by the electorate and remains unchanged in the current Constitution reference in Article IX, section 1 to "other public education programs" was intended to allow the Legislature to depart from a "system of free public schools" as the manner in which it is to provide for the education of Florida's children, by using public funds to provide a private school education.
Moreover, the Defendants' argument that by establishing "other public education programs" the State may educate elementary and secondary students in some way other than through the constitutionally mandated "system of free public schools" leads to an untenable result. That interpretation would permit the State to evade a// of the constitutional requirements regarding the education it is to provide to Florida children -- not only the requirement that this education be provided through a "system of free public schools" -- and would allow the State to provide Florida children with their elementary and secondary education through "other public education programs" that are not "uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and [of] high quality."
The Court concludes, for the reasons set forth above, that the private-school tuition program of section 229.0537 is unconstitutional under Article IX, section 1.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiffs.
2. Section 229.0537, Fla. Stat., insofar as it establishes a program through which the State pays tuition for certain students to attend private schools, is declared to be unconstitutional on its face under Article IX, 1 of the Florida Constitution.
3. Defendants, and all persons and entities acting under their direction or in concert with them, are enjoined from taking any further measures to implement the private-school tuition program of section 229.0537, Fla. Stat., except that the program may continue in effect through the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year with respect to students enrolled in private schools as of the date of this order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this day March, 2000.
L. RALPH SMITH, JR.
Circuit Judge
Copies Furnished to Counsel of Record: ..
W. Dexter Douglass
Thomas Porter Crapps
Douglass Law Firm
P. O. Box 1674
Tallahassee, FL 32308
Carol A. Licko, General Counsel
Frank R. Jimenez, Deputy General Counsel
Reginald J. Brown, Assistant General Counsel
The Capitol - Suite 209
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001
Michael Olenick, General Counsel, , .
Department of Education
The Capitol, PL-08
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General
Thomas E. Warner, Solicitor General
Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General
James A. Peters, Special Counsel
The Capitol, PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Harry L. Hooper, General Counsel
Department of Banking and Finance
101 E. Gaines Street, Suite 526
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Ronald G. Meyer, Meyer and Brooks P.A.
P. O. Box 1547
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Clint Bolick and Matthew Berry
Institute for Justice
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20006
Kenneth W. Sukhia
Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs,
Villareal & Banker, P.A.
P. 0. Box 11240
Tallahassee, FL 32302
Robert H. Chanin
John M. West
Alice O'Brien
805 Fifteenth Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20005
Pamela L. Cooper
Florida Teaching Profession -NEA
213 South Adams Street
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Elliott M. Mincberg
Judith E. Schaeffer
People for the American Way Foundation
2000 M. Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
Andrew K. Kayton
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Inc.
3000 Biscayne Blvd. Suite 215
Miami, Florida 33137
Steven R. Shapiro
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Joan Peppard,
Anti-Defamation League
2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2650
Miami, FL 33131
Michael A. Sussman
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
25 Main Street
Goshen, NY 10924
Elizabeth J. Coleman
Steven M. Freeman
Anti-Defamation League
823 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
Marc D. Stern
American Jewish Congress
15 East 84th Street
New York, NY
Steven K. Green
Ayesha N. Khan
Americans United for Separation of Church and State
1816 Jefferson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Julie Underwood, General Counsel
National School Boards Association
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Frank A. Shepherd
Pacific Legal Foundation
P. 0. Box 522188
Miami, FL 33152
