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ACLU amicus brief in the Elian Gonzalez matter
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
No. 00-0206-CIV-HOEVELER
ELIAN GONZALEZ, a minor, by and through LAZARO GONZALEZ, as next friend, or alternatively as temporary legal custodian, of ELIAN GONZALEZ, a minor,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
v.
JANET RENO, Attorney General of the United States; DORIS MEISSNER, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; ROBERT WALLIS, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service; UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE; and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents/Defendants.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc., In Support of Neither Party
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
BACKGROUND FACTS
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT HAS PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER AND THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
II. THE FATHER HAS A PRESUMPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE CASE AND CUSTODY OF THE CHILD
III. THE CHILD'S OWN RIGHTS OR CIRCUMSTANCE MAY PRESENT A CONCERN THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO OUTWEIGH OR INTERFERE WITH THE PARENT'S RIGHTS, BUT THE STATE CUSTODY "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" STANDARD DOES NOT PRESENT A RELEVANT MECHANISM OF ANALYSIS
IV. THE COURT CAN IMPLEMENT A PROCESS THAT BOTH SUPPORTS THE PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTS SUBSTANTIATED COUNTERVAILING RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The American Civil Liberties Union of Florida ("ACLU of Florida") is a statewide affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, a nationwide, non-partisan and not-for-profit organization with nearly 300,000 members dedicated to advancing principles of liberty embodied in the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The ACLU of Florida has a specific responsibility for initiating ACLU participation in litigation arising in Florida. The Greater Miami Chapter of the ACLU of Florida is the statewide affiliate's local chapter, and has a proud record of involvement and legal activism in civil liberties matters that have arisen in South Florida over more than the last 50 years.
The ACLU of Florida has keen interests in the rights of parents and in the rights of children. The organization has appeared in the United States and Florida courts, both as direct counsel and as amicus curiae , in numerous cases involving constitutional issues relating to family autonomy and familial relationships.For example, the ACLU of Florida appeared in the two current leading cases in Florida on parental rights, Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1998), and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996), in which it advocated positions that were adopted in whole by the Florida Supreme Court. The ACLU National Office recently filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, No. 99-138, October Term, 1999, in which the High Court is likely to address and further delineate some of the Fourteenth Amendment parameters of parental rights in childrearing decisions. Additionally, the ACLU's statewide affiliate in Illinois was counsel of record in the one case nationally bearing some fact similarities to the present action, Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985). In Polovchak, a twelve-year old child visiting from the Soviet Union sought political asylum in the U.S. with the assistance of relatives residing in the U.S. rather than returning to the U.S.S.R. in accordance with his parents' expressed decision.
The ACLU of Florida also has an interest in the rights of immigrants, including, notably, due process rights to judicial review of administrative acts and decisions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. On the government's motion to dismiss, the ACLU of Florida agrees with the plaintiff that the Court has jurisdiction over this action.
The present action, in substance, pits a parent's fundamental constitutional rights against a child's possible individual rights which are equally fundamental if the child possesses a legitimate fear of harm or persecution were he repatriated to Cuba. The interests of both the parent and the child in this instance, however, may lack adequate representation and consideration by the parties of record. The government cannot lay claim to directly or unqualifiedly advancing the constitutional rights of the parent, yet it is those rights that lie at the core of this dispute. In addition, the plaintiff may not solely or disinterestedly represent the relevant interests of the child, yet it is the child's well-being that is palpably at stake at every juncture in this dispute. The parties of record in this case are so encumbered by independent political, diplomatic and legal agendas, either real or perceived, that they function as poor proxies for the effective real parties in interest.
The ACLU of Florida has demonstrated a unique institutional dedication over time to advocating the rights of both parents and children. The organization believes it can concisely offer and suggest in its amicus brief a framework of analysis that may be of assistance to the Court in ascertaining whether there are divergent sets of rights between the parent and the child in this case and in trying to effect a proper balance between those rights if they co-exist. The ACLU of Florida does not presume to know what outcome is appropriate or best for either the parent or the child in this matter, but we can express to the Court a disinterested view that speaks to the interests of the family and family members in a manner consistent with our nation's constitutional traditions and values.
On November 25, 1999, several days prior to his sixth birthday, Elian Gonzalez (the "Child"), a Cuban boy, was found floating on an inner tube off the Florida coast. The Child's perilous circumstance began two days earlier, when accompanied by his mother, her common law husband, and ten others, the Child left Cuba in a small boat which subsequently capsized. The Child was immediately taken to Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital in Hollywood, Florida, where he spent two days being treated for exposure and dehydration.
Having learned that the Child had been taken from Cuba by the boy's mother, and fearing for his safety, Juan Miguel Gonzalez (the "Parent"), contacted relatives in Miami expressing his concerns for the Child's well-being. Hearing of the rescue of a small boy at sea, Lazaro Gonzalez, Juan Miguel's uncle, with members of his immediate family visited the hospital to verify the Child's identity. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) released the Child to the Gonzalez family's temporary custody
Despite the Parent's repeated urging that the Child be returned to his parental care, Lazaro Gonzalez has sought to have the Child remain in the United States fearing his return to a repressive government in Cuba. The dispute created by the Parent's demand for his Child's return and the Florida family's determination to keep the Child in the United States gives rise to this lawsuit.
The INS interviewed the Parent twice in Cuba and reached the conclusion that he is in fact the Child's natural father and that his expressed desire for his Child's return is sincere. Based upon the reports received after those interviews, on January 5th, 2000, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, informed all parties of the U.S. government's decision to return the Child to the care and custody of his Father. Also on January 5, 2000, attorneys for Lazaro Gonzalez sought the Attorney General's reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision.
On January 7, 2000, Lazaro Gonzalez filed Interim and Temporary Petitions for Temporary Custody and other relief in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. The state family court accepted jurisdiction, after a hearing determined that the status quo should be preserved pending a full hearing on Lazaro Gonzalez's petition ,and set March 6, 2000, as the date for that hearing.
On January 12, 2000, the U.S. Attorney General denied Lazaro Gonzalez' request to overturn the Commissioner's decision and declared that treatment of the Child's political asylum application is a matter of federal immigration law preempting the jurisdiction of a state family court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT HAS PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER AND THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The government has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on grounds that the federal district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims. This Court has proper jurisdiction to consider the substantive merits of this action. A federal court has jurisdiction generally to review an INS decision to refuse to consider and thereby summarily reject an affirmative application for political asylum. Use of this Court as a forum for review is especially compelling when, as here, a minor has not been afforded any independent advocate or representative before INS on a putative political asylum application filed exclusively for the child. A father sitting in the country where the child allegedly fears persecution - even if he is sincere and ultimately correct in his position that his child should be returned - cannot reliably or definitively speak to INS on whether his child has a legitimate and substantial fear of political or religious persecution. See generally Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985).
The ACLU of Florida agrees with the plaintiff that this Court has jurisdiction over this action. The relief sought by the plaintiff is not, as the government contends, an attempt to commence removal proceedings. Rather, more accurately, it challenges the INS's refusal to accept and thereby conclusively deny an affirmative asylum application. The government utilizes an expansive reading of INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), to preclude federal district court jurisdiction to review the government's action. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999) ("AADC"), dictates precisely the opposite result. In AADC, the Supreme Court construed § 242(g) and rejected "the unexamined assumption that [§ 242(g)] covers the universe of deportation claims"; rather, the Court said, "what [§ 242(g)] says is much narrower." Id. at 943; see also id. at 945 ("Our narrow reading of [§ 242(g)] makes sense of the statutory scheme as a whole . . . ."); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The Supreme Court in American-Arab narrowly construed INA § 242(g) . . . ."). The Court held that § 242(g) applies only to a discrete subset of actions and decisions by the agency -- specifically, the Attorney General's decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." AADC, 119 S. Ct. at 943; INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The government conduct on which the plaintiff seeks court review -- the INS's decision to refuse to accept and thereby conclusively deny an affirmative asylum application -- is not a decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders" under INA § 242(g), and, therefore, § 242(g) simply does not apply.
In arguing for dismissal of the case without judicial review on the merits in order to repatriate a six year old child to a communist dictatorship, the government adopts its own authoritarian stance that is more than a little ironic. The government properly eschewed state court jurisdiction over the issue of who might speak for the Child, and it appeared then to publicly invite the alternative of the federal district court as a forum for review of its acts and decisions. The government should not be heard to now argue that the federal district court lacks jurisdiction to conduct the invited review in this case. Jurisdictional gamesmanship that has no apparent purpose other than to place the government's conduct in this matter outside the purview of any court in the nation is a deplorable tactic that should have been left at water's edge.
II. THE FATHER HAS A PRESUMPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE CHILD
The Father presumptively has a fundamental constitutional right to custody of his own son. Every parent, moreover, has a right to enjoy the care and companionship of his child, and to make childrearing decisions concerning his child. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect family relationships from undue government interference. A fundamental right to autonomy in parent-child relationships inheres in the concept of liberty, and encompasses a parent's right to make decisions about childrearing. Only when the government is pursuing a compelling interest may it replace the parent and take on responsibility, or allow others to take on parental responsibility, for how a child will be raised.
Over the past seventy-five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the government may interfere in the parent-child relationship only in the service of a "powerful countervailing interest." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 651 (1972). In Stanley, the Supreme Court addressed the most drastic form of state interference -- termination of the parent-child relationship. Under Illinois law, custody of children born to an unwed mother automatically reverted to the state upon the mother's death, thus terminating the relationship between father and children regardless of father's fitness as a parent. Characterizing the constitutional interest in the parent-child relationship as "essential" and one of the "basic civil rights of man," id. at 651, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause required that Stanley be proven unfit before his relationship with his children could be terminated by the state.
The Supreme Court used the same analysis ten years later in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), a constitutional challenge to a New York statute that allowed termination of parental rights upon a showing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that a child had been "permanently neglected." The question in Santosky was whether a "preponderance of the evidence" standard was sufficient in light of the weighty constitutional interests at stake. Noting "this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 753, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 769. Thus, the New York statutory scheme was ruled unconstitutional.
While the Due Process Clause place clear limits on the government's power to end a parent-child relationship, constitutional protections do not stop there. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the central importance of family autonomy and the strong constitutional interest of a parent in the "companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. Several of the Supreme Court's decisions specifically address family autonomy in child-rearing decisions.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language to any student who had not graduated from the eighth grade. Meyer recognized the state's general interest in improving "the quality of its citizens" and the state's specific interest in training students in English. Id. at 401-02. Nonetheless, those state interests were outweighed by the fundamental right of parents "to control the education of their children." Id. Thus, the Nebraska statute was held to violate the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a case involving a constitutional challenge to an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools. The Court had no difficulty holding that the statute violated the rights of Oregon parents under the Due Process Clause:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control . . . . The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 534-35 (citation omitted).
Almost a half century later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional protections provided to parental decisions about child-rearing, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, parents who were Old Order Amish challenged the constitutionality of their criminal convictions under a Wisconsin statute requiring children to attend high school. The Yoders refused to send their children to high school because it conflicted with the Amish religion and way of life. The Court once again recognized that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232. This constitutional interest, together with the free exercise interests of Amish parents, were held sufficient to override the state's strong interest in universal education.
Few rights or values are more firmly entrenched in our constitutional universe under Supreme Court jurisprudence than those of parents. The intrusion on family autonomy caused by the government's, and the plaintiff's, failure to return the Child to his Father over the last three months is a significant one, and possibly poses as much in the way of constitutional harm to the Child's rights as it does to those of the Parent. The damage already caused to the Parent, to the Child and to the familial relationship in this instance is irreparable and substantial. Those considerations likely should lie at the foundation of this Court's analysis and determination in this matter.
III. THE CHILD'S OWN RIGHTS OR CIRCUMSTANCE MAY PRESENT A CONCERN THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO OUTWEIGH OR INTERFERE WITH THE PARENT'S RIGHTS, BUT THE STATE CUSTODY "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" STANDARD DOES NOT PRESENT A RELEVANT MECHANISM OF ANALYSIS
Parental rights are fundamental, but they are not absolute. Compelling interests warranting interference in the parent-child relationship are sometimes found to exist. Typically such interests are generated by state family court determinations that a parent is unfit to raise the child, or that there is imminent danger of physical of emotional harm to the child at the hands of the parent if the child is left in the parent's care. There are no such allegations or claims in this case, however, and traditional parental unfitness models have no relevance to or bearing on this litigation.
There is a narrow line of cases which may be instructive to the Court that articulate circumstances allowing the government to override a parent's childrearing decision even when a parent is not unfit. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a child's own constitutional right to make important decisions for herself must take precedence over parental control. See, e.g., Bellotti v.Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(state must provide opportunity for minor to seek court order allowing her to obtain abortion without parental involvement). Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), additionally provides a precedent for the government to override a parent's child-rearing decision even in the absence of a countervailing constitutional interest. In Prince, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Due Process Clause prohibited Massachusetts from enforcing its child labor laws against Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness who wished her niece and ward to accompany her and help her sell religious publications. While recognizing that there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter," id. at 166, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that Massachusetts did not violate Mrs. Prince's constitutional rights by prosecuting her for violating the state's child labor laws.
Prince and Bellotti cannot be read as charters authorizing wholesale intervention in a parent's judgments about child-rearing. Instead, Prince is best understood as an example of court deference to a state's use of its police power to protect children as a class from the dangerous conditions associated with child labor, a rampant social problem in many parts of the country in the first part of this century. Id. at 168. Indeed, the Supreme Court has limited Prince to a "narrow scope," recognizing that the decision was influenced by "the Court's severe characterization of the evils that it thought the legislature could legitimately associate with child labor . . . ." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30. Bellotti more directly than Prince suggests institution of procedural protections for children may be warranted when the child wishes to competently assert an essential autonomous right that is not supported by parental judgment.
Both Prince and Bellotti nonetheless can provide valid, if limited, theoretical models for the Court to permit or countenance intrusions on family autonomy and parental rights when there is a fit parent. Court protection of a legitimate political asylum claim that is independent of the parent's individual circumstance and contrary to the parent's wishes, for example, fits within the molds of Prince and Bellotti. A child's own due process rights are implicated when the government seeks to effectuate or enforce a parent's decision of repatriation which has the consequence of placing the child at serious risk of physical harm or if the child possesses a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Cf. Polovchak , 774 F.2d at 736-37. Under Prince, a government obligation and interest can be articulated requiring protection of a child in government custody from particularized harm that would be incurred if the child were returned to a country where he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution. Likewise, under Bellotti, it seems clear that when independent essential life or liberty interests of the child are imminently threatened, those interests may outweigh the judgment and rights of the parent.
None of the relevant interests that might dictate giving priority to the Child's rights or circumstance, however, is generated by reference or use of the family-court "best interests of the child" standard. This domestic-law "best interests of the child" standard is, by its nature, imprecise and incapable of specification. In the present circumstance, it would shift powers to the Court at the expense of a fit parent, and plainly conflicts with the constitutional protections afforded to parental decisionmaking. Delegating to a parent the authority to raise as he sees fit, except apparently when an extended family member or a court thinks another choice would be better, is to give the parent no authority at all.
The family-court "best interest of the child" standard has historically been reserved for cases involving conflict between two parents who are dissolving their relationship in state court proceedings, or cases in which there is not a fit parent to care for the child. In that context, a court's determination is constitutionally permissible because the conflict between the parents leaves no parental decisionmaker to whom the court can defer. A court could not constitutionally engage in such an inquiry, however, as between a fit parent and a nonparental third party. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. Similarly, when a state is confronted with unfit parents in a dependency hearing, it cannot be constitutionally questioned that the rights of those parents are secondary and that the child's best interest is paramount. In such cases, a parent cannot or will not care for the child, and the state therefore has a compelling interest in providing care.
In this instance, the plaintiff is not asking that the government act, or be permitted to act, in loco parentis in the absence of a fit parent. Nor is one fit parent pitted against another. Instead, the Court is being asked to act on behalf of a third party to override the judgment of a fit parent about what is best for his child. Under such circumstances, application of a family-court best interest test is itself an unconstitutional intrusion into the parent-child relationship and does not in any way sharpen or enhance the more appropriate, narrower inquiry of whether the child has a legitimate fear of persecution or harm that might in this instance outweigh parental rights.
IV. THE COURT CAN IMPLEMENT A PROCESS THAT BOTH SUPPORTS THE PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTS SUBSTANTIATED COUNTERVAILING RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Because of the potentially divergent interests between the Father and the Child, amicus urges the Court to utilize a framework of analysis that seeks to vindicate both sets of interests.
With any six year old child, there remains considerable question whether a viable political asylum claim can be alleged independent of a parent's judgment and circumstance. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 736 (A twelve year old is "presumably near the lower end of a an age range in which a minor may be mature enough to assert certain individual rights that equal or override those of his parents."). Moreover, in this instance, the allegation that the Child has a substantial fear of persecution creates the danger of delay, thus interfering with the Father's rights. In this highly unique case, although proceedings on a political asylum application for the Child may be warranted, there should be some sensible predicates established before initiating the forms of relief requested by the plaintiff.
Before requiring further INS proceedings or granting injunctive relief for the plaintiff, the ACLU of Florida suggests that the Court appoint an independent attorney ad litem, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 17(c), to advise the Court on whether the Child has a colorable claim for political asylum, and whether the Child seeks to pursue a colorable claim for asylum. If this threshold is established and met, the Court can be satisfied that the Child may have independent interests that are sufficiently compelling for the Court to consider overriding parental rights and can then order the INS and the attorney ad litem, on the child's behalf, to proceed on an asylum application. Only in that narrow circumstance, in the ACLU of Florida's view, can further substantial delay or impediment to the reunion of the Parent and the Child be justified.
To his credit, the plaintiff has suggested appointment of a guardian ad litem, pursuant to Rule 17(c). However, the purpose of that appointment is not for the broad mandate that plaintiff proposes. Rather, under the unique circumstances of this case, the Court should appoint an attorney ad litem to advise the Court on whether the Child has a colorable claim for political asylum, and whether the Child seeks to pursue a colorable claim for asylum. Absent the presentation of a genuine viable basis for an independent political asylum application for the Child, however, amicus would stress that a strong presumption remains in favor of the Parent, and would urge the Court to act promptly to vindicate these rights.
Dated: February 22, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
Andrew H. Kayton, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 889563
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Inc
3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 215
Miami, FL 33137
Tel. no. (305) 576-2337
Fax. no. (305) 576-1106
Brenda Bernstein Shapiro, Esq.
Law Office of Brenda Bernstein Shapiro
44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2100
Miami, Florida 33130
Tel no. (305) 577-3861
Fax no. (305) 577-4551
COOPERATING ATTORNEYS FOR THE GREATER MIAMI CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. mail this _____ day of February, 2000 to:
DAVID W. OGDEN, ESQ.
PATRICIA L. MAHER, ESQ.
THOMAS W. HUSSEY, ESQ.
DAVID J. KLINE, ESQ.
WILLIAM J. HOWARD
JOCELYN M. WRIGHT
RUSSELL J.E. VERBY
JOHN P. MORAN
MICHELLE GORDEN
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
DEXTER A. LEE, ESQ.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, Florida 33132
KENDALL COFEY, ESQ.
Coffey, Diaz & O'naghten, L.L.P.
Co-Counsel for Elian Gonzalez
and Lazaro Gonzalez
2655 South Bayshore Drive
Suite 200
Miami, Florida 33133
SPENCER EIG, ESQ.
Law Offices of Spencer Eig
Co-Counsel for Elian Gonzalez
and Lazaro Gonzalez
420 Lincoln Road, Suite 379
Miami Beach, Florida 33139
LINDA OSBERG-BRAUN, ESQ.
ROGER A. BERNSTEIN, ESQ.
Hackley, Bernstein & Osberg-Braun, P.L.
Co-Counsel for Elian Gonzalez
and Lazaro Gonzalez
2875 N.E. 191st Street, PH-1B
Aventura, Florida 33180
BARBARA LAGOA, ESQ.
JUDD J. GOLDBERG, ESQ.
Greenberg Traurig, P.A.
Co-Counsel for Elian Gonzalez
and Lazaro Gonzalez
1221 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
JOSE GARCIA PEDROSA, ESQ.
Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster
& Russell, P.A.
Co-Counsel for Elian Gonzalez and Lazaro Gonzalez
701 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
By: _______________________________
Andrew H. Kayton, Esq.
