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Memorandum Seeking Al Najjar's Immediate Release from Custody
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Filed May 14, 2002
MAZEN AL NAJJAR,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice; JAMES ZIGLAR, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; ROBERT WALLIS, District Director, Miami District of the INS; and DONALD McKELVY, Warden, Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Coleman, Florida,
Respondents.
______________________________________/
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Immediate Release from Custody
Introduction
Dr. Mazen Al Najjar, a stateless Palestinian being detained pursuant to a final deportation order, seeks his immediate release because his continuing detention is both unauthorized by statute and unconstitutional. Dr. Al Najjar has been subject to a final and executable order of deportation since November 13, 2001, and has been detained pursuant to that order ? in solitary confinement ? since November 24, 2001. The applicable immigration statute ? 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995) ? authorizes the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to detain aliens for a maximum period of six months after the final order of deportation becomes executable. If the INS does not effectuate departure within six months, it must release the alien, although it may impose supervisory conditions on release. The only exception to this is when the alien has taken action during the removal period to obstruct the government's removal efforts. Al Najjar has fully cooperated with INS authorities in seeking to effectuate his removal. The six-month period in his case ended on May 13, 2002, yet the INS has not released Al Najjar. Accordingly, he is now being held in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
In addition, Al Najjar's continued detention is unconstitutional. The country to which Al Najjar has been ordered deported, the United Arab Emirates, has expressly stated that it will not admit Al Najjar. As a stateless Palestinian, he has no right to return to any country at all. Accordingly, there is no significant likelihood that he will be deported in the reasonably foreseeable future, and detention under those circumstances violates due process. Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Moreover, Al Najjar has been found to pose no danger or flight risk warranting detention. While this Court previously ruled that the Attorney General may detain aliens subject to final deportation orders for six months without any showing that they are dangerous or a flight risk, the Court also recognized that such authority was limited to six months. That period has now passed, and surely any further detention requires at a minimum a showing that there is a need to detain Al Najjar because he is dangerous or a flight risk. No such showing has been made here; in fact, an immigration judge found precisely the opposite after a two-week hearing, concluding that the INS had presented no evidence to support its claim that Al Najjar posed a threat to national security. For that reason as well, Al Najjar's detention violates due process.
Al Najjar therefore requests that this Court order his immediate release on the grounds that his continued detention violates the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Statement of Facts
A. Prior Proceedings
Dr. Al Najjar's case has been before this Court on two prior occasions, but this proceeding presents questions distinct from those at issue in the prior proceedings. His first habeas petition challenged the legality of his detention while his immigration proceedings were pending. He was ultimately detained for three and one-half years on the basis of secret evidence that neither he nor his lawyers were permitted to see. In Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F.Supp.2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000), vacated as moot on other grounds, Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001), this Court held that Al Najjar's detention violated his constitutional rights and the INA, and remanded for a rehearing on his custody status at which he was to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to the government's charges.
The custody rehearing that followed ultimately led to Al Najjar's release from custody on December 15, 2000, after an immigration judge held a two-week hearing and ruled that Al Najjar did not pose a threat to national security. The immigration judge wrote a 56-page decision categorically rejecting all of the government's claims against Al Najjar as unsupported by any evidence of record. A true and accurate copy of the October 27 IJ Opinion is submitted as Attachment 2. The government appealed, and sought to stay Al Najjar's release, but both the BIA and the Attorney General declined to stay Al Najjar's release. Al Najjar remained free on bond from December 15, 2000 to November 23, 2001. The INS does not allege that Al Najjar engaged in any activity during the year that he was free on bond that threatened the national security or the community, or that indicated that he was a risk of flight.
Al Najjar's second habeas petition challenged his re-arrest and detention on November 24, 2001, following completion of the Eleventh Circuit's judicial review of Al Najjar's deportation order. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). On November 13, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit issued the mandate in the deportation order case, which had the effect of lifting a stay on the execution of Al Najjar's deportation order and constituted the final judicial review of the order of deportation. At the time of his re-arrest, the Department of Justice explained that it had detained Al Najjar pursuant to an INS policy of detaining "'individuals who have a final order of deportation while it prepares for their removal from the United States if they are a flight risk, a threat to the community or a threat to national security.'" Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F. Supp.2d 1235, 1238 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting DOJ statement). The Department, however, cited no new evidence, but merely repeated the very allegations that had been found unsupported by the evidence in the INS's own administrative process one year earlier.
On February 19, 2002, this Court dismissed Al Najjar's second habeas petition. It determined that 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995) was the applicable statute governing Al Najjar's detention, but interpreted that statute to afford the Attorney General six months from the time the order of deportation became executable to detain Al Najjar pending his removal. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1240 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
B. Material Facts for this Habeas Petition
On November 13, 2001, when the Eleventh Circuit issued the mandate in connection with Al Najjar's petition for judicial review of his deportation order, his deportation order became final and executable, and judicial review was completed.
On November 24, 2001, the government re-arrested Al Najjar and placed him in solitary confinement in a maximum security federal prison in Coleman, Florida. Until very recently, he was denied all contact with others in the prison, denied any contact visits with his family, subjected to routine strip searches, and confined to his cell for 23 hours a day. These conditions are far worse than those imposed on many convicted murderers, yet Al Najjar has not even been accused of committing a crime.
The respondents' authority to detain Al Najjar is governed by 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995). Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F.Supp.2d at 1240. That statute authorizes detention of aliens subject to final deportation orders for a maximum of six months pending the government's attempt to effectuate their departure from the United States. Id. Thereafter, they must be released, although the INS may impose supervisory conditions on their release. 8 U.S.C. ?1252(d) (1995).
The six month period in this case began to run with the November 13, 2001, issuance of the Eleventh Circuit mandate in Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262. As of May 14, 2002, Al Najjar has been detained by respondents beyond the statutory six-month period.
Al Najjar has cooperated fully in seeking to effectuate his removal from the United States. Through counsel, he has provided all relevant travel-related documents, consulted with the INS regularly, and done everything within his power to facilitate his removal. His counsel, Joseph Hohenstein, has communicated orally or in writing with INS officials virtually every week since Al Najjar's deportation order became executable, and has also communicated with the embassies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to seek to facilitate Al Najjar's deportation. See Affidavit of Joseph Hohenstein, Attachment 1. However, these efforts have not been successful. Egypt has yet to issue Al Najjar a renewed travel document, a prerequisite to traveling anywhere ? Al Najjar is a stateless Palestinian, and has no passport.
More significantly, on March 11, 2002, the U.A.E. embassy officially notified Al Najjar's counsel that Al Najjar will not be admitted to the U.A.E. Mar. 11, 2002 Letter from Saeed R. Al Zaabi to Joseph Hohenstein, Exhibit O to Hohenstein Affidavit. As a stateless Palestinian, Al Najjar has no right to emigrate to the U.A.E. He last lived there almost 20 years ago on a temporary workers' visa. In recent years, the U.A.E. has not granted entry to stateless Palestinians with Egyptian travel documents. Statement of Consulate General of the State of Palestine, Dubai, U.A.E. A true and accurate copy of the Statement is submitted as Attachment 3.
Even before his deportation order was final, Al Najjar made extensive efforts to find a country that would accept him, only to find those efforts frustrated by federal authorities. The INS took his Egyptian travel document, and then lost it, making it very difficult for him to apply for admission to other countries. Hohenstein Affidavit at ? 17. And when Al Najjar managed to surmount those difficulties (and the even greater difficulties created by the government's never-substantiated but much publicized allegation that he belonged to a terrorist group), the U.S. government appears to have blocked his departure to Guyana. In 1997-98, friends and family of Al Najjar contacted authorities in several countries in an attempt to find a country to which he could go. After much searching, they identified Guyana as a country that at least initially agreed to admit Al Najjar and his family. However, after Guyana authorities met with U.S. officials in 1998, Guyana rescinded its offer of admission. Hohenstein Affidavit at ? 24.
Argument
I. 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) GOVERNS AL NAJJAR'S DETENTION AND EXPRESSLY LIMITS THE PERIOD OF DETENTION TO SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE THE DEPORTATION ORDER BECAME EXECUTABLE
The immigration statute governing Al Najjar's detention ? 8 U.S.C. ?1252 (1995) ? limits that detention to a period of six months from the time that his deportation order became executable. The six month period may be tolled only if, during the removal period, the alien has sought judicial review that delays his removal, or otherwise affirmatively obstructs his removal. The six month period in Al Najjar's case has now run. Al Najjar has done nothing to obstruct his removal, and to the contrary has cooperated fully with the INS. Therefore, he must now be released. The INS may place supervisory conditions upon his release, see 8 U.S.C. ?1252(d), but it may not detain him further unless he violates those conditions.
As this Court held in its previous decision, Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F.Supp.2d at 1240, Al Najjar is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995). This is because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which enacted what is now 8 U.S.C. ?1231(a), does not apply to aliens who were in pending deportation proceedings on April 1, 1997. Indeed, the government conceded in prior proceedings involving Al Najjar that because Al Najjar's proceedings were pending on April 1, 1997, his detention is governed by the law as it stood before its amendment by IIRIRA. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft , 257 F.3d at 1276; IIRIRA, ?309, reprinted?in 8 U.S.C. ?1101 note; see also Respondents' Answer to and Motion (and Memorandum) to Dismiss Mazen Al Najjar's Habeas Petition and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, in Al Najjar v. Reno, No. 99-3458-CIV-LENARD/TURNOFF, at 25 and n.5 (filed Jan. 31, 2000) (asserting that 8 U.S.C. ?1252 (1995) applies to Al Najjar's detention because he was in a pending deportation proceeding on April 1, 1997, and therefore his detention is not governed by the IIRIRA amendments). Because Al Najjar's detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. ?1252 (1995), and not 8 U.S.C. ?1231(a), he is not subject to the INS's regulations regarding administrative review of detention pending removal. By their own terms, those regulations apply only to custody and parole decisions "under section 241(a)(6) and 212(d)(5)(A)" of the INA, see 8 C.F.R. ?241.4 (2002), and neither of those provisions apply to Al Najjar. See also 8 C.F.R. ?241.13 (2002) (regulation regarding administrative review of whether removal is likely in the foreseeable future applies to "aliens ... who are detained under the custody review procedures provided at ?241.4"). Therefore, unlike aliens held under 8 U.S.C. ?1231(a), Al Najjar has no administrative remedies to exhaust. See Boz v. United States, 248 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that aliens governed by 8 C.F.R. ?241 must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of their detention on grounds that they are not likely to be removed in the foreseeable future). Boz does not apply here because 8 C.F.R. ?241.4 does not apply to Al Najjar, and in any event the administrative review scheme set forth in ?241.4 does not even address the principal issue presented here ? namely, whether the six month period has expired. The government's service of a notice indicating that it is going to review Al Najjar's continued detention, see note 3 supra, thus misses the point, because it fails to acknowledge that it no longer has any authority to continue Al Najjar's detention.
Section 1252(c) provides that:
When a final order of deportation under administrative process is made against any alien, the Attorney General shall have a period of six months from the date of such order, or if judicial review is had, then from the date of the final order of the court, within which to effect the alien's departure from the United States, during which period, at the Attorney General's discretion, the alien may be detained, released on bond ... or released on such other condition as the Attorney General may prescribe.
8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995).
If the alien is not deported within six months, 8 U.S.C. ?1252(d) (1995) then governs, and requires release of the alien. It provides that:
Any alien, against whom a final order of deportation ... has been outstanding for more than six months, shall, pending eventual deportation, be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such regulations shall include provisions which will require any alien subject to supervision (1) to appear from time to time before an immigration officer for identification; (2) to submit, if necessary to medical and psychiatric examination at the expense of the United States; (3) to give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper; and (4) to conform to such reasonable written restrictions on his conduct or activities as are prescribed by the Attorney General in his case. Any alien who shall willfully fail to comply with such regulations, or willfully fail to appear or to give information or submit to medical or psychiatric examination if required, or knowingly give false information in relation to the requirements of such regulation, or knowingly violate a reasonable restriction imposed upon his conduct or activity, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
8 U.S.C. ?1252(d) (1995).
These provisions are unambiguous: aliens subject to deportation orders may be detained for a maximum of six months from the time that their deportation order becomes final and executable, and thereafter must be released. Confirming this clarity, every federal court to address the issue has held that absent judicial review or obstructionist conduct by the alien himself (which may toll the six-month period), an alien detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) (1995) must be released after six months of his deportation order becoming executable. United States ex rel. Daniman v. Shaughnessy, 210 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that if deportation has not been effectuated in six months, 8 U.S.C. ?1252 allows supervision, but does not authorize "holding him in custody"); Shrode v. Rowoldt, 213 F.2d 810, 811, 813 (8th Cir. 1954) (affirming order to release alien who was held more than six months, and stating that "detention of the alien is not permitted beyond the six month period"). See also: Balogun v. INS , 9 F.3d 347, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Section 1252(c) authorizes detention for only six months, but that the period may be tolled if the alien affirmatively obstructs his deportation during the removal period); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Under Section 1252(c), habeas relief for the denial of bail is proper if the Attorney General fails to deport the alien within six months after the final order of deportation, excluding any judicial review"); Sivongxay v. Reno, 56 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1168, 1173 (W.D. Wa. 1999) (holding that under 8 U.S.C. ?1252(c) and (d), the INS cannot detain an alien "for more than six months"); Dallis v. Brady, 766 F.Supp. 901, 905 (D. Colo. 1991) ("If there has been no deportation within the six-month period, the Petitioner must be released subject to supervision as provided for in 8 U.S.C. ? 1252"); Castillo-Gradis v. Turnage, 752 F.Supp. 937, 940-41 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "[o]nce the six months has expired, the alien must be released and put under supervision until the INS is ready to execute his deportation"); United States ex rel. Lee Ah Youw v. Shaughnessy, 102 F.Supp. 799, 801-02 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) (same).
Under these uniform precedents, the INS was required to release Al Najjar on May 14, 2002, when the six month period from the time that his deportation order became executable expired. The only exception that courts have recognized to this rule is where the alien seeks judicial review that delays his removal, or otherwise obstructs his removal. Balogun v. INS, 9 F.3d at 351; Dor v. District Director, INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1989); Castillo-Gradis, 752 F.Supp. at 940.
Al Najjar fits neither exception. He instituted no litigation challenging or delaying his removal after the mandate issued on November 13, 2001. The only litigation he pursued was focused exclusively on the fact and conditions of his confinement, and did not challenge his removal order. And through counsel, Al Najjar has done everything within his power to facilitate his removal, including almost weekly contacts between his counsel and INS, as detailed in the Affidavit of Joseph Hohenstein, Attachment 1.
Therefore, the INS's statutory authority for detaining Al Najjar expired on May 13, 2002, and he should be released forthwith.
II. AL NAJJAR'S FURTHER DETENTION VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Al Najjar's continued detention also violates substantive due process. The Court need not reach this issue if it concludes that the INS lacks statutory authority to keep him detained. But if it finds that statutory authority to detain continues, it should nonetheless order Al Najjar's release on constitutional grounds for either of two independent reasons: (1) there is no significant likelihood that he will be deported in the foreseeable future; and (2) the government has made no showing that he poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
A. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT LIKELIHOOD THAT AL NAJJAR WILL BE DEPORTED IN THE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE FUTURE
Al Najjar's continued detention violates due process because there is no significant likelihood that he will be deported in the reasonably foreseeable future. As noted above, the country to which Al Najjar has been ordered deported ? the United Arab Emirates ? has stated that it will not admit him. Mar. 11, 2002 Letter from Saeed R. Al Zaabi to Joseph Hohenstein, Exhibit O to Hohenstein Affidavit. Al Najjar has no right to go to the U.A.E., as he has never been a citizen of that country. Indeed, because he is a stateless Palestinian born in Gaza, there is no country in the world to which he has a right to return, and therefore other countries are not likely to admit him on anything other than a permanent resident status visa. Al Najjar therefore finds himself in a situation quite common among stateless Palestinians ? ordered deported, but with no country to which he can return.
As this Court recognized in its prior decision, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), reasoned that detention for immigration purposes where deportation was not likely to occur in the foreseeable future violates substantive due process. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F.Supp.2d at 1243. The Supreme Court interpreted 8 U.S.C. ?1231 in light of that constitutional principle, and held that aliens may not be detained, even if they are dangerous, where there is "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court interpreted the statute to impose a ceiling of six months of detention for purposes of effectuating removal, and held that thereafter, if there is no significant likelihood of removal, the alien must be released. Id.
Al Najjar has shown that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and therefore his continued detention violates due process.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AL NAJJAR POSES A THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY OR A RISK OF FLIGHT
Al Najjar's continued detention independently violates substantive due process because there is no evidence that he poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Al Najjar asserted a similar contention in his prior habeas petition. At that time, however, this Court denied the claim by reading Zadvydas?to authorize six months of detention for removal purposes whether or not the alien posed a danger or a flight risk. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F.Supp.2d at 1242. Petitioner has appealed that ruling. But under this Court's prior ruling, now that the six month period has expired, Al Najjar's constitutional challenge to his detention without evidence that he poses a danger or a flight risk is again ripe. Id. ("Petitioner's deportation order became final on November 13, 2001; thus, his detention is presumed lawful until May 14, 2002."). To hold him any longer in the absence of evidence that he poses a danger or flight risk, and indeed in the face of an administrative determination that he does not, violates due process.
"Freedom from imprisonment ? from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint ? lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690. Even aliens subject to a final deportation order retain a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free from confinement. Id. at 692-94. This fundamental right to liberty is not absolute, of course, but can be restricted only in accordance with both procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 690; see also United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 737, 746 (1987); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504?U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997).
"[G]overnment detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause" unless it is ordered as punishment in a criminal proceeding, or "in certain special and 'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances.'" Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690. The INS's sole authority to detain aliens is incidental to its authority to deport. It may detain aliens living here for only two reasons: (1) where detention is necessary to ensure that a deportation order can be carried out, i.e., where the alien is a flight risk; and (2) where detention is necessary to protect the community while deportation is being effectuated, i.e., where the alien is dangerous to the community or national security. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690-91.
Accordingly, it has long been the settled rule that aliens living here may be detained ? before or after a final order of deportation ? only where there is a "reasonable foundation" that they are either a flight risk or a danger to the community. Where an alien is neither dangerous nor a flight risk, detention is not even rationally related to effectuating his deportation, serves no legitimate purpose, and violates due process. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (preventive detention violates substantive due process where it is excessive in light of the government's legitimate regulatory purposes).
Relying on the above principles, three courts of appeals ? all in unanimous decisions ? have recently declared that detention of criminal aliens without an individualized showing that the alien poses either a danger or flight risk violates due process. Phu Chan Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001). All three courts relied on Zadvydas to rule that aliens have a constitutional liberty interest in being free of physical custody, and that due process requires an individualized showing of flight risk or dangerousness to justify preventive detention. Those decisions further support the proposition that Al Najjar cannot be held without an individualized finding of danger or flight risk. Here, there has been an individualized finding to the contrary, and therefore he must be released. .
Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, this Court should declare Al Najjar's current detention unlawful, order his immediate release, and enjoin the INS from further detaining him unless he violates reasonable conditions imposed upon his release.
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________________________
Respectfully Submitted,
David Cole, Esq.
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-9078
(202) 662-9408 (fax)
Randall C. Marshall, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 181765
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Inc.
4500 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 340
Miami, FL 33137
(305) 576-2337
(305) 576-1106 (fax)
Joseph C. Hohenstein, Esq.
Nationalities Service Center
1300 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 893-8400
(215) 735-9718 (fax)
Nancy Chang, Esq.
Center for Constitutional Rights
666 Broadway ? 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
(212) 614-6420
(212) 614-6499 (fax)
Ira J. Kurzban, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 225517
Kurzban Kurzban Weinger & Tetzell
2650 SW 27 Avenue
Miami, FL 33133-3003
(305) 444-0060
(305) 444-3503 (fax)
Martin B. Schwartz, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 880371
Law Office of Martin B. Schwartz
Premier North Executive Building
3816 West Linebaugh Avenue, Suite 401
Tampa, FL 33624
(813) 269-7421
(813) 269-7562 (fax)
Certificate of Conference Re: Service of Process
I certify that on this 14th day of May, 2002, I conferred by telephone with Douglas E. Ginsburg, Esq., who agreed to accept service for each of the named defendants.
Randall C. Marshall
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the forgoing document has been furnished by overnight delivery, this 14th day of May, 2002, to the following counsel:
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Esq.
Michael P. Lindemann, Esq.
Douglas E. Ginsburg, Esq.
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
I further certify that a true and accurate copy of the forgoing document has been furnished by hand delivery, this 14th day of May, 2002, to the following counsel:
Guy Lewis, Esq.
Dexter Lee, Esq.
U.S. Attorney's Office
99 NE 4th Street
Miami, FL 33132
___________________________________
Randall C. Marshall
